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Abstract
Auditors play an important role by ensuring that the firm’s external stakeholders
base their decisions on information subject to adequate controls. In this study, we
explore the effects the option of voluntary audit has had on small firms’ accounting
quality and behaviour. We use a detailed data set on all businesses in Norway gath-
ered by the Norwegian Tax Authorities. We present quasi-experimental evidence
showing the negative causal effect opting out of audit has on accounting quality,
and clear evidence of behavioural effects in the form of bunching below the revenue
threshold for voluntary audit. Our findings suggest that the option of voluntary
audit has led to an increased risk of external stakeholders basing their decisions
on lower quality information. Evidence of bunching behaviour indicates that firms
bunch by either exercising earnings management activities or reducing output.
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Introduction
In this paper we evaluate Norway’s implementation of voluntary audit for small
limited companies in 2011 in three steps. The reform allowed limited companies
with less than NOK 5 million in revenues, NOK 20 million in total assets and no
more than 10 full time equivalent employees (FTE) the right to voluntary audit. In
the first step we evaluate if small Norwegian-registered Foreign Companies (NUFs),
which already had the option of voluntary audit, have lower accounting quality than
small limited companies in the period leading up to the law change. Secondly, we
evaluate if opting out of audit leads to lower accounting quality for small limited
companies. Lastly, we investigate if the implementation of threshold values for
voluntary audit has affected small Norwegian firms’ behaviour.
Several policies were aimed at reducing the relative attractiveness of NUF as a
corporate form in the years from 2011, and we want to explore if these initiatives
were well founded from an accounting quality perspective. Voluntary audit for small
limited companies has been implemented in all Nordic countries and most countries
within the EU, but few papers assess the relationship between dropping an auditor
and accounting quality. The recent law change in Norway has made it possible
to explore this relationship and motivates our research. Firms’ financial statements
constitute the basis of their tax payments, and is an important source of information
to other external stakeholders. We find it interesting to see if the removal of a control
mechanism (audit) leads to opportunistic behaviour (through earnings management)
and less accurate reporting. A decrease in accounting quality can lead to a wrongful
tax basis. This constitutes a cost to society in the form of lost tax revenues and
may weaken tax morale, breaking with the notion that everyone should pay their
share. Other external stakeholders are also affected by a potential weakening in
accounting quality. Suppliers will for example need to make decisions on whether
their clients should be allowed to receive credit or not based on information from
financial statements. Lower accounting quality reduces the trustworthiness of firms’
financial statements, which increases the risk of making decisions with inadequate
information.
1
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In addition to investigating differences in accounting quality, we explore the pos-
sibility that firms actively bunch below the threshold for voluntary audit to avoid
being audited (e.g. to avoid the cost it represents). Firms can adapt to the thresh-
olds by either reducing output or intentionally misstating their earnings, which both
represents a cost to society. The implementation of new regulations can often have
unintended consequences and documenting these are of great importance to policy
makers. Both the Norwegian Progress Party and the Conservative Party have in-
cluded an increase in threshold values for voluntary audit in their political platforms,
which further stresses the importance of uncovering the effects of this policy.
Several names and definitions for accounting quality exist, and there is no universally
accepted measure for accounting quality (Dechow et al., 2010, Hope et al., 2013).
We therefore assess accounting quality using seven measurements. Four measures
pertain to accruals, one addresses earnings smoothing and the last two assess timely
loss recognition. This should allow us to generalize our results, mitigate concerns
about fundamentals influencing our findings, and allow us to determine the source
of differences in accounting quality (Barth et al., 2008).
We do not find conclusive evidence of differences in accounting quality between
small NUFs and limited companies. Descriptive statistics show that the only major
difference between the corporate forms is that NUFs in general do not have an
auditor. Our findings suggest that small NUFs have lower accruals quality than small
limited companies prior to the law change, but less accruals relative to operating cash
flow. We find that NUFs report losses more timely than limited companies. This
study is correlational and we can not determine if the lack of auditor use, or other
factors, are responsible for the differences in accounting quality. Limited companies
and NUFs may differ in unobserved characteristics. If these characteristics are
correlated with both accounting quality and the corporate form, this yields biased
estimates. Assuming there are no such characteristics is unrealistic, and halts a
causal interpretation of the model. We find no statistical significant relationship
between auditor use and our accounting quality measures, which suggest that other
factors are responsible for the differences we find.
The 2011 reform enables us to assess the casual relationship between opting out of
audit and accounting quality for small limited firms using a difference-in-difference
(DiD) design. The model is based on the assumption that unobserved differences
between the treatment and control groups are the same over time in absence of
treatment, and the only thing that differs is whether they use an auditor or not. This
is a realistic and testable assumption, and it allows us to make causal interpretations.
By using the same measurements for accounting quality as in the first analysis, we
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present quasi-experimental evidence showing the negative causal effect dropping
an auditor has on accounting quality. We use one treatment group and two control
groups. The treatment group contains firms dropping their auditor. The first control
group consist of firms that keep their auditor, and the second contains firms not
eligible for voluntary audit. We show that opting out of audit leads to lower accruals
quality, more earnings smoothing and less timely loss recognition.
In our final analysis we show another effect of the reform by using the bunching-
methodology presented by Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011). The introduction of
a revenue-limit for voluntary audit causes firms to actively bunch below the thresh-
old. By aggregating post-reform data, we see clear indications of bunching in the
area just below the threshold compared to the distribution in absence of a threshold.
There are no signs of bunching behaviour prior to the reform. Exploration of the
post-reform year-by-year distribution of firms shows that the bunching behaviour
intensifies with time.
We contribute to the existing literature on accounting quality and voluntary audit in
several ways. In our NUF analysis we use a different set of measures on a richer data
set supplied by the Norwegian Tax Authorities. When assessing the implementation
of voluntary audit we establish a causal relationship between opting out of audit
and accounting quality. We use Norwegian data of high quality, and measurements
encompassing more dimensions of accounting quality than any other paper, to the
best of our knowledge. Research on bunching behaviour below the thresholds of
voluntary audit have, to our knowledge, never been conducted before. This makes
our contribution unique. It is also a new application for the methodology presented
in Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011).
Our findings will be of use when evaluating the tax reform of 2011, and to countries
contemplating voluntary audit for small firms. Our focus is on the cost of imple-
menting voluntary audit, not its benefits (e.g. lower administrative burdens). We
do not discuss the choice between the two, as this is a political question. The costs
in question are potential lost tax revenues and costs associated with lower quality
financial accounts.
The paper is organized as follows: Section I describes our hypothesis developments,
which is derived from background information and previous research. Section II
describes our data material and explains our sample selection. Section III presents
the research design for the three parts of our paper. Section IV presents our results,
and section V summarizes.
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Hypothesis Development
2.1 Background
In this section we introduce the background for the implementation of voluntary
audit for small limited companies in Norway and explain what the law change entails.
Next we outline the role of Norwegian-registered Foreign Companies (NUFs).
2.1.1 The Implementation of Voluntary Audit in Norway
Small Norwegian limited companies (AS) were, effective May 1st 2011, eligible for
voluntary audit as long as they fulfilled certain requirements. Until this point
the principal rule was that all companies which had an accounting obligation were
obliged to have an auditor (Revisorloven, 1999).
In 2007 a committee, Revisjonspliktsutvalget, was appointed to assess the audit leg-
islation in Norway. The majority of its members were in favour of keeping statutory
audits for limited companies. They also wanted to impose statutory audit on small
NUFs, which at that time were not obliged to have an auditor. The committee’s
minority argued that the cost of audit was substantial for small firms, and that sev-
eral EU countries had agreed to introduce voluntary audit. The need for reductions
in administrative burdens, in line with the EU target of a 25 per cent reduction by
2012, and the limited benefit of audit to users of small firms’ financial records, were
also part of the minority’s arguments (European Commission, 2012, NOU, 2008). In
the end legislators chose to introduce voluntary audit for small firms with revenues
less than NOK 5 million, NOK 20 million in total assets, and no more than 10 FTE.
By the end of 2011, approximately 48,000 out of 80,000 companies had chosen to
opt out of audit, and two out of three newly registered limited companies chose
not to hire an auditor. The aggregate tax payments from firms who opted out of
audit were approximately NOK 1.42 billion in 2011, NOK 2.24 billion in 2012 and
NOK 2.86 billion in 2013. The firm’s board can decide not to have the its financial
4
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accounts audited, by authorisation through a majority vote in the general assembly
(Altinn, 2014).
2.1.2 The Role of NUFs
In the early 2000s, NUF became an increasingly popular corporate form in Norway.
Small NUFs were, as opposed to limited companies, eligible for voluntary audit
before 2011 if they had revenues less than NOK 5 million. By incorporating in a
country with low share capital requirements (e.g. the UK where the requirement
is 1 pound), NUFs could bypass the relative high Norwegian requirement of NOK
100,000 in share capital for establishing a limited company. A NUF is treated like
a limited liability company, which means it is not liable for funds exceeding what
is injected in to the company. This could lead to NUFs taking on more risk, with
little to no equity. Registering the legal entity behind the NUF abroad gave the
Norwegian government limited possibilities to monitor them. The Norwegian Tax
Authorities wanted to implement statutory audit for all NUFs in 2005, as this was
thought to benefit the authorities in the form of higher accounting quality and tax
collection (NOU, 2008). The Ministry of Finance decided to delay their decision
until a recommendation was given by Revisjonspliktsutvalget.
Questions were raised about the reputability of some of these firms, and the Nor-
wegian government finally implemented measures in part targeted at reducing the
relative attractiveness of NUF over AS as corporate form. In addition to interlac-
ing the auditor requirements for small limited companies and NUFs, the Norwegian
government reduced the requirement in share capital for limited companies from
NOK 100,000 to NOK 30,000 in 2012 (Regjeringen, 2011). It was followed by new
regulation in 2013 which allowed NUFs to change their corporate form to AS (or
ASA) without any additional costs, in reality with the click of a button (Regjeringen,
2013).
The number of newly established NUFs has been decreasing rapidly, and 2012 was
the first year since 1989 in which a reduction in the total number of NUFs was
observed. In 2013 there were 1,195 newly registered and 12,135 NUFs in total,
compared to 3,639 and 17,184 in 2011. While the number of newly registered NUFs
has been declining, the number of newly registered limited companies was 57.6
percent higher in 2012 relative to 2011 (The Brønnøysund Register Centre, 2013).
This may suggest that several NUFs changed their corporate form to AS.
Larsen & Løchen 5
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2.2 Accounting Quality
In this section we present our view of accounting quality (AQ) and our choice of AQ
measures.
2.2.1 The Accounting Quality Perspective
We want to explore the aspect of accounting quality from the tax authority’s point of
view, as they are the largest external user of firms’ financial reports. They process all
firms’ financial accounts, and AQ will affect the foundation for companies’ rightful
tax basis. From this point of view, firms’ accounting quality will depend on how
well the information in their financial statements, in line with the respective laws
and regulations, reflect their true activities. Firms have contradicting incentives
in their reporting. If they could, they would like to report low earnings to the
tax authorities to minimize tax payments, and higher earnings to other external
stakeholders to signal financial robustness. The firms’ external stakeholders would
however like them to report numbers that reflect their true activities. A supplier
wants to be certain that the company in question can pay its accounts payable, and
a bank wants to assess the firms’ true ability to repay its loans. If reported numbers
are not in line with regulations or do not reflect true activities, this constitutes low
AQ. What constitutes high AQ for the tax authorities, will thus coincide with the
firms’ other external stakeholders’ perception of high AQ. Langli (2009) shows that
external stakeholders have varying use of small limited companies financial accounts
(i.e. 65 per cent of the companies do not have employees), but our point of view
will take all groups in to account.
Several names and definitions for accounting quality exist, and there is no universally
accepted measure for AQ (Dechow et al., 2010, Hope et al., 2013). In line with our
view we explore accounting quality from three angles; Accruals, earnings smoothing
and timely loss recognition. AQ can also be evaluated using value relevance metrics,
but we do not include these as our companies are not publicly listed (Barth et al.,
2008). Using several metrics to assess AQ is advantageous in multiple ways. AQ
is multidimensional, and using multiple measures should support us in generalizing
our results. Results from one single proxy could capture other factors than AQ (e.g.
fundamentals) and these factors may drive the result. Using several proxies can
mitigate this risk. Furthermore, the use of several proxies should theoretically allow
us to determine the source of the difference in accounting quality.
6 Larsen & Løchen
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2.2.2 Accounting Quality Measures
Accrual Based Measures
Accruals are in part based on estimates and assumptions. This leaves them open
to manipulation, and makes accrual based measures well suited to assess AQ. We
use four measures that have all been used to assess the differences in AQ between
groups of firms in previous research. Some of our measures cover the extent of firms’
use of accruals in general, while others are targeted to specific accruals items. The
specific accruals items we choose to look at are accruals in which managers have a
high degree of flexibility. These are operating accruals related to the firm’s daily
operations, and covers accounting items such as receivables, property plant and
equipment (PPE) and inventory. An advantage of focusing on operating accruals
is that they are short-term accruals, and we should be able to reveal the effects of
these in the time period we are looking at.
Our first measure is developed by Jones (1991) and modified by Kothari et al.
(2005), measuring the general level of discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals
are based on managements’ estimates and judgement, and include a high level of
flexibility. Managers have the best knowledge to set these estimates correctly, but
the estimates are also open to manipulation. A high level of discretionary accru-
als increases the opportunity of mistakes or manipulations, and is thus a sensible
indicator for AQ.
The second measure is based on Dechow and Dichev (2002), and further developed
by Francis et al. (2005) and Ball and Shivakumar (2006), measuring discretionary
estimation errors in accruals. This is measured through working capital accruals,
and assesses to what extent managers are able to estimate their accruals correctly.
Working capital accruals are easily detectable in the short-term, which means they
are a good measure within the time frame of our data. We use the modified measure
as it includes long-term drivers of accruals, such as PPE and the change in revenue,
and is thus not limited by the strict short-term nature of Dechow and Dichev’s
model.
The third proxy is Stubben (2010)’s discretionary revenue model. A large part of
companies’ total revenues are often discretionary. In line with the revenue recogni-
tion principle, revenues are recognized when they are realized. The proxy models
premature revenue recognition and its effect on the relationship between accounts
receivable and revenues. The author shows that the discretionary revenue model can
detect cases of earnings manipulation, even when traditional accrual models can not,
using Securities and Exchange Commission data on actual earnings misstatements.
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Lastly we use a proxy developed by Burgstahler et al. (2006) measuring the relative
size of firms’ accruals. This is a rough measure, as it assumes that more accruals
relative to operating cash flow translate to lower AQ. While we focus on discretion
and manipulation, it is interesting to see whether the relative size of accrual coincides
with the other measure of accrual quality.
Earnings Smoothing
Having a direct measure of earnings smoothing can be beneficial in instances where
the firms in question have few or no accruals. Earnings smoothing affects the taxable
income for a company, as it can be used to both minimize and stabilize earnings.
Our measure of earnings smoothing is based on Barth et al. (2008), which use it to
assess earnings smoothing in a setting where it is hypothesized that companies aim
for smooth and positive earnings. This may be more important for publicly listed
companies, and may not be directly relatable to our firms.
Timely Loss Recognition
Timely loss recognition relates to the conservatism principle stating that unrealized
losses should be recognised immediately if there is uncertainty about the outcome.
We use two measures to assess timely loss recognition. The first measure is devel-
oped by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and relates to conditional conservatism. More
conditional conservatism indicates higher AQ. It is a non-stock-market version of
Basu (1997)’s measure of conditional conservatism, and we choose to use it because
the firms we investigate are not listed. The model incorporates the role of accruals
in conditional conservatism, which the four direct accruals models fail to do. The
measure is thus a good complement to these. Hope et al. (2013) uses this measure
to assess differences in AQ between small private and public firms.
The second timely loss recognition measure assesses firms frequency of big losses and
is developed by Barth et al. (2008). A lower frequency of reported large negative
results reflects lower AQ, as this can be an indication of losses being spread out over
a period of time. With this measure we also get to measure timely loss recognition
for firms that do not have a lot of accruals.
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2.3 Previous Research
In this section we present previous research describing the relationship between AQ
and auditors. We then present research examining AQ in NUFs. In the following
two sections we review general observations and previous empirical studies exploring
the effects of voluntary audit internationally and in Norway. In the last section we
review the effect of thresholds on firm behaviour.
2.3.1 Accounting Quality and Auditors
A company with an accounting obligation is responsible for ensuring that their fi-
nancial statements are prepared in accordance with the prevailing regulation. This
can either be done in-house or by an external accountant. An auditor is an inde-
pendent firm hired by the company subject to the audit. The auditor’s role is to
give an independent and objective assessment of whether the company’s financial
statements are free of material misstatements, which can be the result of errors or
deliberate manipulations (NOU, 2008). This is to ensure that external stakeholders
base their decisions on information subject to adequate controls.
The link between auditors and accounting quality is examined in several papers.
Krishnan (2003) finds that firms audited by a Big N auditor categorized as an
industry specialist have lower levels of discretionary accruals than clients of ”non
specialists”.1 While clients of Big N auditors have a higher level of total accruals,
their level of discretionary accruals are lower than firms audited by non-Big N firms
(Becker et al., 1998, Francis et al., 1999). Lastly, Caramanis and Lennox (2008)
establishes a negative correlation between numbers of auditing hours worked, and
the level of income-increasing accruals in a firm. All of these studies are based on
discretionary accruals measures. Dedman and Kausar (2012) finds that firms with
an auditor have more conservatism and higher accruals quality, indicating that being
audited is associated with higher AQ.
2.3.2 Accounting Quality and NUFs
Despite NUFs questionable reputation, little research has been conducted in terms
of documenting whether this reputation is justified. The only research we can find
is an article based on a master thesis written by Frøyshov and Johansen (2011).
1The top tier accounting firms. Prior to 2002 these were Deloitte, PwC, KPMG, EY and Arthur
Andersen. Today these are Deloitte, PwC, KPMG, EY and BDO.
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They look at differences in accounting quality between NUFs and small limited
companies, and the study was conducted before the law change on voluntary audit
for small limited companies was enacted. By adapting and developing six markers
for measuring accounting quality based on the methodology in Barth et al. (2008),
they try to establish a connection between the corporate form, and the correspond-
ing accounting quality. The analysis is correlational, and uses earnings smoothing,
earnings manipulation and timely loss recognition measures as proxies for AQ.
In their analysis, which also includes a comprehensive review of the firm-characteristics
that applies to the average NUF, the authors use data compiled by SNF and NHH,
in addition to a database compiled by the Brønnøysund Register Centre specifically
on NUFs. While comprehensive, the study suffers somewhat from a lack of data as
the authors only have accounting data for 5,435 unique NUFs (representing 19,9per
cent of the total). Their findings do not offer grounds to conclude whether NUFs or
limited companies have higher accounting quality.
We distinguish ourselves from their study by using a different set of proxies for AQ.
Their proxies are used exclusively on large companies prior to their study. Most of
our proxies have been used to assess AQ in small firms, which is why we believe
them to be better suited to the data material. Only two of our proxies overlap with
their study, allowing us to assess AQ from other angles, while also allowing us to
compare our findings. We have a more comprehensive data set, as our data from the
Norwegian Tax Authorities includes data on NUFs that do not send their financial
reports to the Brønnøysund Register Centre. Based on NUFs reputation, and the
government’s focus on reducing the attractiveness of NUF as a corporate form, our
first hypothesis is as follows:
H1: NUFs have lower AQ than comparable limited companies.
2.3.3 Implementation of Voluntary Audit in Other Coun-
tries
A country’s overall institutional system (Ball, 2001) and firms’ incentives for fi-
nancial reporting greatly influence firms’ AQ. Hence, looking at evidence from im-
plementation of voluntary audit in countries with similar institutional frames as
Norway, such as Denmark, Sweden and Finland, could give us indications about the
anticipated affects. As little empirical research on voluntary audit has been con-
ducted in the Nordic countries, we also look at experiences from the UK. The UK
has been a pioneer in the case of voluntary audit and empirical research has been
done evaluating the post-reform effects.
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Evidence from Other Nordic Countries
In Denmark, thresholds for voluntary audit were implemented in 2006 (Norwegian
Ministry of Finance, 2011). The thresholds were revenues of DKK 3 million, total
assets of DKK 1,5 million and 12 FTE. Companies that did not exceed two out of
three thresholds for two consecutive years, were eligible for voluntary audit. With
these rules, approximately 76,000 out of 186,000 limited companies (approximately
41 percent) were allowed to drop their auditor. We find no empirical studies investi-
gating the effects of the reform, but the Danish Business Authority evaluates the law
change based on observations done in the following fiscal year (2007). They report
that 22.8 percent out of the firms eligible for voluntary audit choose to drop their
auditor, but 30.6 percent out of these firms continue to use an auditor for other du-
ties (such as preparation of annual reports). In 2011 the Danish Business Authority
review a randomly selected sample of 1,200 annual reports from fiscal years 2010 and
2011. They conclude that the amount of errors in the financial accounts are higher
for firms that drop their auditor compared to those continuing to be audited (Danish
Business Authority, 2011), but these findings are merely descriptive. As they do not
conduct an empirical analysis, controlling for other factors that may influence the
number of errors in the annual reports, they can not conclude on whether the higher
number of errors is caused by the reform or other factors. Most of these errors are
connected to firms’ lack of knowledge concerning accounting regulations. In relation
to the effect on tax control, the evaluation shows that there are more errors in the
tax returns of firms who are not audited.
Sweden implemented voluntary audit in 2010. Firms not exceeding two out of
three thresholds were subject to voluntary audit. The limits were revenues of SEK
3 million, total assets of SEK 1.5 million and 3 employees. This entailed that
250,000 limited companies, 70 percent of all limited companies in Sweden, could
opt out of audit. 64,000 limited companies had chosen to do so by August 2012.
We do not find any empirical research evaluating the reform, but in a press release
Bolagsverket (2012), the Swedish Companies Registration Office, claim they receive
a higher number of annual reports of lower quality in 2012 after the voluntary audit
is introduced. The evaluation presented is anecdotal, and based on the amount of
errors, not financial determinants of AQ. The number of fees sent out to companies
that fail to deliver their financial accounts within the set deadline have also increased
by 10 percent. Statistics show that two out of three start-ups choose not to appoint
an auditor.
Finland introduced voluntary audit in 2007 for firms that did not exceed two out
of three thresholds the last two fiscal years. The thresholds were revenues of EUR
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200,000, total assets of EUR 100,000 and 3 employees. By the end of 2008 approxi-
mately 6 percent of all limited companies had chosen to opt out of audit. Roughly
one out of two start-ups chose not to use an auditor. In their paper, Ojala et al.
(2011) hypothesize that accruals quality, post reform, is higher for audited than
for non-audited debt financed small companies. They apply a DiD-design with
one treatment and one control group. The authors use one proxy, measuring dis-
cretionary estimation errors in accruals, for AQ. They find weak causal empirical
evidence supporting their hypothesis for companies funded by director’s loans, but
not for companies funded by external debt.
Our study distinguishes itself from the Danish and Swedish evaluations as we at-
tempt to establish a causal relationship between audit and AQ, while their eval-
uations were descriptive and carried out by their respective government entities.
Ojala et al. (2011)’s study uses only one accrual based measure for AQ, compared
to our seven measures of AQ. They also limit their sample to debt financed compa-
nies, while we look at all firms. Neither do they attempt to look at firm behaviour
around the thresholds as we do.
Evidence from the UK
The EU allowed their member states to implement voluntary audit through the
EU Fourth Directive in 1978. The UK introduced voluntary audit in 1994, and
progressively raised their threshold until it was set at the EU maximum in 2004.
The EU limits were then (in GBP) £5.6M in turnover, total assets of £2.8M and 50
employees (EU, 2013, UK Government, 2015).2 To be eligible for voluntary audit
a firm has to satisfy at least two out of three limits. In 2005 it was estimated that
880,000 companies chose to opt out of audit, comprising approximately 83 percent
of all small and active limited companies in the UK (Professional Oversight Board
for Accountancy, 2006).
Dedman and Kausar (2012) use a DiD-design to examine accrual quality and conser-
vatism for private UK firms after the change in thresholds in 2004. Their treatment
group is firms who opt out of audit, and their control group contains firms who re-
tain their auditor. Their conservatism and accruals based tests indicate that opting
out of audit is associated with lower AQ. They also find that firms retaining their
auditor experience significantly higher credit scores than firms opting out. This
research is in line with Lennox and Pittman (2011)’s findings, who suggests that
2Today, the EU maximum limits are no more than EUR 8 million (£6.5M) in revenues, EUR
4 million (£3.26M) in total assets and 50 employees (EU, 2013), and the UK operates with these
thresholds (UK Government, 2015)
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firms choosing voluntary audit attracts upgrades to their ratings through positive
signalling, while firms opting out experience downgrades to their ratings due to the
negative signals associated with this.
Both studies use the FAME database, which relies on company reports to Companies
House. This is unverified data, which likely makes it of lesser quality. The coverage
of the database is not very comprehensive for the years included in these studies
(Anayadike-Danes, 2015). Small and medium-sized companies are not obliged to
share information about employment, assets and turnover, which means that the
study only covers the firms reporting it voluntarily. This may lead to problems with
selection bias. Our data covers the universe of Norwegian firms, is collected by the
Norwegian Tax Authorities, and should as such be of higher quality. Furthermore,
Dedman and Kausar (2012) uses one model for timely loss recognition, and two
models for accrual quality to assess AQ, whereas we use seven measures in total.
They do not evaluate firm behaviour in relation to the thresholds as we do.
2.3.4 Implementation of Voluntary Audit in Norway
The first major evaluation of the 2011 law change came at the end of March 2015,
in the form of a multidimensional study by Langli (2015). One part of the study
assesses AQ by using measures for accruals quality and timely loss recognition. The
measures are based on Hope et al. (2013), and the study is conducted on the same
data material as we use. His findings indicate that there is a general worsening in
AQ amongst firms opting out of audit, primarily for firms with a lot of inventory,
customer receivables or a combination there of. He also finds indications of a decrease
in AQ when the firms in question have high levels of debt.
His study was commissioned to evaluate the effects of the 2011 law change, and
as such does not evaluate accounting quality for NUFs prior to the law change.
As NUFs have been subjected to voluntary audit for several years, and as they
figure in the debate preceding the law change, we find it prudent to include this in
our analysis. While his study is comprehensive, his choice of research design when
assessing AQ may give biased estimates. He evaluates the reform with cross-sectional
analyses for year 2010, 2011 and 2012 separately.3 With this design it is not possible
to control for unobserved but fixed omitted variables and year fixed effects. Cross
sectional estimates are therefore often higher than fixed effects estimates (Angrist
and Pischke, 2008). In our analysis we try to control for this by exploiting the
3For the two timely loss recognition proxies he uses all years present in the data material, and
he uses a pooled regression.
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advantages of panel data and control for firm and year-fixed effects. Lastly we
assess small firms behavioural changes, in the form of bunching behaviour post
reform, something which Langli does not consider.
With the law-change enacted in 2011, excluding Langli (2015), there has been limited
opportunity to empirically evaluate the full impact of the reform. The analyses that
have been conducted are primarily master theses, such as Bjørnerud and Vestli
(2013) and Borgersen and Thorsbakken (2014). They both base their theses on
financial reports sent to the Brønnøysund Register Centre.
Bjørnerud and Vestli look at two different aspects of AQ. They use two proxies
for discretionary accruals and one discretionary revenue model. Their study is de-
scriptive and they investigate if mean values for their AQ measures differ between
firms who keep and drop their auditor, pre and post reform. They do not find any
significant mean differences. They also look at how auditor-choice affect AQ. Their
findings suggest that companies using a ”Big 4” auditor in 2010 and subsequently
opt out, experience a significant decrease in AQ. This indicates that auditor-type is
an important determinant of AQ. They also find evidence that companies using a
“Big 4” auditor have higher AQ than companies using a ”non-Big 4” auditor. The
limited number of metrics used is a weakness with this study. As the paper points
out, they only have access to data for one year in which the law change was active,
further reducing the reliability of their findings.
Borgersen and Thorsbakken (2014) postulate that a general loosening in the re-
quirements for statutory audits can increase competition amongst auditors. This
can result in auditors signing off on financial statements of lower quality in order to
keep their clients, which could decrease the general level of AQ for firms still subject
to statutory audit. The authors focus on private limited companies, with NOK 5M
to NOK 70M in revenues from 2009 to 2012, and use six indicators to measure AQ.
Their findings do not indicate a general worsening of the accounting quality over
the chosen period, and they find no differences in AQ between companies audited
by ”Big 4” vs. ”non-Big 4” auditors.
Their study is correlational, and the proposed relationship between increased com-
petition and decreased AQ is interesting in relation to our choice of control groups.
Auditors face large reputational risk should they fail to deliver a thorough and inde-
pendent assessment of a company’s financial statements. This is especially critical
for ”Big 4” auditors in strictly enforced regulatory regimes, of which the Scandina-
vian countries rank the highest, though it is less prevalent for ”non-Big4” auditors
(Francis and Wang, 2008, Leuz et al., 2003). Langli and Svanstro¨m (2013) do how-
ever point out that the potential downside in reputational risk is lower when the
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auditors’ clients are private and receive less publicity. Borgersen and Thorsbakken’s
findings show that firms not eligible for voluntary audit are not affected by the
reform, and these firms should thus make a good control group in our analysis.
Our study distinguishes itself from Bjørnerud and Vestli’s as we analyze accounting
quality along more dimensions. We also try to establish a casual relationship between
opting out of audit and AQ, by using a DiD design with a treatment group and two
control groups. Our study focuses on firms within the limits of voluntary audit,
which separates us from Borgersen and Thorsbakken. Lastly, our data material
covers more years, and is of higher quality than the previous studies as it is compiled
by the Norwegian Tax Authorities.
Empirical research on AQ and auditors, both in Norway and in other countries,
suggest that there may be a relationship between dropping your auditor and AQ.
We believe that removing a control mechanism may lead to some firms exploiting this
opportunity, and increases the likelihood of not detecting errors. We hypothesize
that:
H2: Opting out of audit leads to a decrease in accounting quality
2.3.5 The Effect of Thresholds on Firm Behaviour
Nearly 70 percent of all limited companies in Norway have revenues less than NOK 5
million, and small companies are considered important drivers of economic growth.4
The threshold for voluntary audit is size-dependent and the cost of audit can be
substantial for small firms (Langli, 2009). Firms situated in the region around the
threshold might actively try to avoid being audited, because they do not want their
accounts revised or to avoid the cost of audit. In order to this they either have to
reduce output or manipulate their accounts.
We find no prior studies on how the implementation of threshold values for voluntary
audit has affected small firms’ behaviour in Norway or in any other countries. In
terms of related research, Harju et al. (2015) study the effect of value-add tax (VAT)
thresholds on the behaviour of small businesses in Finland. Firms with annual sales
lower than 8,500 EUR are not liable to pay VAT, and the researchers find that firms
actively bunch just below this threshold. The authors suggest that firms respond
to this threshold by reducing output, as they find no evidence of tax avoidance or
evasion. They argue that the threshold acts as a brake for the growth of small com-
panies, as the bunching behaviour is observed as relatively permanent. In another
4Based on numbers from 2013. 179,848 out of 260,155 limited companies have less than 5
million in revenues.
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study, Onji (2009) documents the effects of the implementation of VAT thresholds
in Japan, focusing on the reactions of larger firms. By comparing corporate size
distributions before and after the VAT introduction in 1989, he finds a cluster of
corporations just below the threshold value. This suggests that larger firms respond
to this threshold by splitting into smaller entities in order to avoid VAT. Li and
Lockwood (2014) study the VAT-threshold in the UK, and find that firms actively
bunch just below the threshold, and that this is partly driven by under-reporting.
Empirical evidence from research on VAT-thresholds shows that firms actively bunch
below them in different countries, suggesting that this could be an international
phenomenon. The VAT thresholds are similar to the thresholds for voluntary audit
in that they are both linked with the economic activity of the firms. As small firms
face extra costs by ending up above the threshold in both cases, and because some
firms may want to avoid being audited for other reasons, we hypothesize that some
firms will actively bunch below the thresholds for voluntary audit. Before 2011 it was
not clear if the government would implement voluntary audit, and the committee
commissioned to assess the potential law change advised against it. We therefore
do not expect to see any firms adapt to the potential law change in the years before
2011. NUFs have been subject to these thresholds for a long time, while small
limited companies have only had three years to respond to them. Our hypothesis is:
H3: The introduction of a threshold for voluntary audit causes firms to actively
bunch below it.
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Data, Sample Selection and
Descriptive Statistics
In this section we start of describing the data set we base our analyses on. We then
outline the rationale behind our sample selections for the three parts of our study.
Lastly, we provide descriptive statistics for these samples.5
3.1 Data Source
Our data set contains accounting data for the universe of Norwegian firms gathered
by the Norwegian Tax Authorities. The data is anonymous and as it is gathered by
the tax authorities it also contains data on firms who do not report their numbers
to the Brønnøyund Register Centre. All firms have an obligation to report their
numbers to Brønnøysund, but not all firms do. Our data set contains 1,971,580
firm-year observations in the time period 2006 to 2013. It has 380,648 unique firm
observations, where 331,404 and 35,590 are observations of limited companies (AS)
and NUFs respectively. The size and extent of the sample distinguishes this study
from previous studies, and it will enable us to maximize the chance of uncovering
specific and significant mean differences.
3.2 Sample Selection
3.2.1 Descriptive Analysis of AQ for NUFs
For the first part of our study, where we do a correlational analysis comparing the
accounting quality of small NUFs to small limited companies, we remove firms with
5All descriptive statistics are done on our final samples. This means that we only describe firms
meeting our selection criterion.
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negative, missing or more than NOK 5 million in revenues. We also remove firms
with negative, missing or more than NOK 20 million in total assets or more than
10 employees. Furthermore, we remove firms without an industry code and firms
dissolving their business. There is a large re-classification of NACE-codes effective
in 2009, which is not corrected in our data set. In order to classify firms in the most
correct way, we set the NACE-codes prior to 2009 equal to the code in 2009. This
imposes the assumption that no firm could have changed industry prior to 2009. We
also remove firms within the finance and power industry, as their financial accounts
are not comparable to the other firms in our sample. After doing this, we still observe
firms with billions in financial income. We remove firms with financial income higher
than NOK 5 million, as we choose to classify them as financial companies due to
their extensive financial activity. We keep observations for firms between 2006 and
2010. Table A.2 summarizes the sample selection, and we are left with 107,597 and
8,886 unique firm observations of AS and NUF respectively.
3.2.2 DiD Analysis of AQ in Limited Companies
For the second part of our study, where we explore the causal effect of opting out
of audit, we follow the same reasoning with our sample selection criterion as in the
NUF analysis. We keep firms with NOK 5 to 10 million in revenues, because we
want to use these as an extra control group in our analyses. We exclude all NUFs,
as the reform was targeted towards limited companies. The time-period we look at
is now 2006-2013. To be able to compare the firms’ AQ before and after the reform,
we balance our data set. This leaves us with 452,432 firm-year observations and
56,554 unique firm observations, as shown in table A.3.6
3.2.3 Discontinuity Analysis of the Threshold for Voluntary
Audit
In the third part of our study, we investigate if we observe bunching behaviour below
the threshold for voluntary audit for NUFs in the years between 2006 and 2013, and
for limited companies pre and post reform. We remove all firms that are obliged to
have an auditor even though they operate below the threshold values. These include
finance, auditing, accounting and law firms.
6For the analysis, year 2006 is dropped as we scale our variables by lagged total assets, which
leaves observations for 2006 missing.
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 What Distinguishes a NUF from a Limited Company?
The number of registered NUFs increases every year in our chosen time period (2006-
2010). There are 1,643 and 6,470 unique observations of NUFs in 2006 and 2010
respectively. This represents an approximate 300% rise in the total number of NUFs
in the time period.7 In our data set, companies changing their corporate form are
given a new organization number. This makes it impossible to identify those firms
who have changed from NUF to AS.
The NUFs within our sample are eligible for voluntary audit during the whole period,
and the share of NUFs using an auditor is less than 1 percent each year. This
is exhibited in table A.4. Most NUFs operate within Academic, Scientific and
Technical services, Trade, Construction and IT. Table A.5 and A.6 show descriptive
statistics for the sample of NUFs and limited companies respectively. Mean values
for number of employees, revenues and assets indicate that limited companies are
larger than NUFs in our sample.
In order to model the differences between a NUF and an AS, we have estimated a
probit regression model that predicts the probability that a firm is a NUF. In our
search to find the most parsimonious model that reflects the ”true” model we start
out very generally, including all available variables that can explain the differences
between the corporate forms. We then remove the least significant variables, one
by one. To check the robustness of our results, we also apply a regular OLS and
logit model. This does not appreciably change our results. Table A.7 exhibits our
probit model (dprobit to show marginal probabilities), and the regression shows
the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the probability that a firm is
a NUF. The result can be interpreted as follows: The coefficient of -0.2294 for the
variable ”auditor” means that the probability that a firm is a NUF decreases with
approximately 23 percent if the firm has an auditor. This result is not surprising,
as very few NUFs have an auditor. The model generally signals that there are very
small differences in the marginal probabilities of each explanatory variable on the
probability of whether a firm is an AS or a NUF.
7We do not look at the time period between 2011 and 2013, but an interesting note is that
the number of registered NUF starts declining from 2012 on. 2012 was the year that equity share
capital requirements for AS was lowered from NOK 100,000 to 30,000 and NUFs were in 2013
allowed to change corporate form to AS without additional costs.
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3.3.2 What Characterizes a Firm that Drops its Auditor?
Table A.8, A.9 and A.10 shows descriptive group statistics for our treatment and
control groups, both before and after 2011. Firms described in table A.8 and A.9
are firms qualified for voluntary audit, which choose to opt out of audit (treatment
group) and keep their auditor (first control group) respectively.8 Firms in table
A.10 are firms with five to ten millions in revenues and are hence not qualified for
voluntary audit (second control group).9 The mean threshold values for the firms
qualified for voluntary audit are thus naturally lower than for the firms not qualified
for voluntary audit. Comparing the two groups that qualify for voluntary audit
shows that firms which opt out have on average more employees, lower revenues and
less assets than firms who keep their auditor.
In order to model what characterizes a firm which opts out of audit, we have esti-
mated a probit regression model following the same approach as we did modelling
NUF characteristics.10 The characteristics are based on data from 2006-2010. Look-
ing at their attributes before they drop their auditor could provide us with informa-
tion on why they choose to opt out. Table A.11 displays the results of the model.
The factor with the biggest influence on the probability of a firm dropping its audi-
tor is whether it has an external accountant. By having an external accountant the
probability of opting out of audit increases by approximately 17%. Other factors
with high positive influence are if the owner is also CEO of the firm, if it has a lot
of inventory and if it has had a negative auditor report in the past. Factors that in-
fluence the probability of opting out of audit negatively are total revenues and total
assets, which suggest that the larger a firm is the lower the probability of it dropping
its auditor. If a firm operates within agriculture, forestry and fishing, health and
social work, private household or other services it increases the probability of opting
out, while working within mining and quarrying, real estate and business activities
decreases the probability.
3.3.3 What Characterizes a ”Bunching” Firm?
In table A.12 we describe the characteristics of firms positioned just below the
revenue threshold for voluntary audit, using an OLS regression as done in Harju
et al. (2015).11 Column (1) exhibits the results of the regression where we regress
8Firms which are not law, auditing or accounting firms, with values for number of employees,
revenues and assets less than the set threshold values.
9Includes law, auditing and accounting firms below the thresholds.
10Tests with regular OLS and logit models provided the same results.
11A probit model yield the same results
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the dependent variable ”Buncher”, a dummy variable of having total revenues be-
tween NOK 4,900,000-5,000,000 millions, on firm level characteristics.12 To make
the results comparable, we run the same regression for firms located just below and
above the potential bunchers. Column (2) and column (3) show the results of re-
gressions with dependent variables of belonging to to total revenues region NOK
4,750,000-4,850,000 and NOK 5,050,000-5,150,000. We call these placebo group 1
and 2 respectively. The ”just below” control variables indicate if the firm has been
in the bunching region in previous years, and the ”just above” variables indicate if
the firms have been right above the threshold in previous periods.
Coefficients for being in the bunching region in the two previous periods are positive
and highly significant. The interaction term on the other hand is negative and
significant at a 10 percent level. This suggests that past behaviour significantly
explains bunching, as being located in the bunching region one of the past two years
increase the possibility of being in the bunching region today. However, the bunching
behaviour does not seem to be persistent. Past behaviour of bunching firms does
not explain current behaviour more than past behaviour of placebo firms explain
their current behaviour. The interaction term for the placebo groups is positive,
suggesting that firms are also more persistently located in these regions.
The coefficients for being located just above the threshold in previous periods are
positive and highly significant. This suggests that firms are more likely to bunch
below the threshold if they are located just above the threshold in previous years.
This could have a natural explanation connected to firm performance, or it could be
done by either reducing output, or misstating financial reports. The same applies
to the placebo groups, which suggest that past behaviour does not explain current
behaviour more for bunchers than for the placebos. The interaction terms are not
significant for any of the groups. Firms which operate within the health and social
work industry are less likely to bunch.
12The final model is found by using the general to specific method, where we include all relevant
variables and remove the least significant variable after each run of the regression
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Research Design
In this section we outline the research design behind our analyses. Variable defi-
nitions are exhibited in table A.1 and explained in the text the first time they are
used. We first present the general model for our AQ analyses, followed by a detailed
explanation of the AQ measures and control variables used. Lastly, we describe the
research design for the analysis of firm behaviour around the threshold for voluntary
audit.
4.1 General Model
We use seven measures as proxies for AQ. The first four measures relate to accruals
quality, the fifth to earnings smoothing and the last two to timely loss recognition.
Our general model is:
AQ = Xitγ + βDummy1 + βDummy2 + it (4.1)
Where
• AQ is a measure of accounting quality
• Xitγ includes control variables. It also includes time and firm fixed effects
when applicable.
• Dummy1 is a dummy variable indicating if the firm has the ability to opt out
of audit.
• Dummy2 is a dummy variable indicating if the firm has an auditor.
We control for robust standard errors and cluster at firm level.
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4.1.1 Descriptive analysis of AQ for NUFs
In our first analysis we use a correlational design. We use an OLS-regression model
in order to find significant differences in AQ between small NUFs and limited com-
panies. Dummy1 is equal to one if the company is a NUF , as all NUFs in our
sample are eligible for voluntary audit. Dummy2 is Auditor, and it is equal to 1
if the firm is audited. The results of this model may only be interpreted causally
under the assumption that small NUFs and limited companies do not differ in un-
observed characteristics correlated with company form and AQ. This assumption
is unrealistic and not possible to test. Therefore the results can not be interpreted
causally, as the estimates may be biased. Thus, we can not determine if it is the lack
of auditor use in NUFs that is responsible for possible differences in AQ between
the two corporate forms. We include time fixed effects where applicable, and use
control variables known to affect AQ. We also control for firm characteristics.
4.1.2 DiD Analysis of AQ in Limited Companies
In order to explore if opting out of audit causes a decrease in AQ, we use a DiD
design where Dummy1 is Can opt out and is equal to one if the firm qualifies for
voluntary audit. Dummy2 is Drop aud, which is equal to one if the firm drops
its auditor. With a DiD design we look at the difference in differences in AQ for
our treatment and control groups before and after the reform. The treatment is
dropping your auditor. With this design we can interpret the results causally under
the assumption of parallel trends in AQ in absence of treatment. This assumption
is much more realistic than the assumption in our first model, and we also test it
by conducting a placebo test imposing the assumption that the law change happens
in 2009 (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). With this setup we exploit the advantages
of quasi-experimental data. We use two control groups and one treatment group.
The treatment group consist of firms choosing to drop their auditor. Our control
groups are firms who retain their auditor, and firms not eligible for voluntary audit.
We include firm and year fixed effects to control for potential unobserved but fixed
omitted variables.
4.2 Accounting Quality Measures
We use seven measurements for AQ that have been used in previous research. The
measurements were originally developed to look at AQ in larger firms, but have also
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been used on samples containing small firms. As accruals are central in several of
our measurements for AQ, we need to define it. We do not have data on firms’ cash
flows, and we will define accruals based on the accounting variables we have.
4.2.1 Accruals Definition
The revenue recognition and the matching principle are accounting principles stating
that revenues shall be recognized when they are realized, and costs in the same period
as their corresponding revenues. According to Dechow (1994), accruals deal with
timing and matching problems innate in cash flows so that earnings better describe
firm performance. In line with the recognition and matching principle, we derive
the following relationship between net income, accruals and cash flows for firm i in
year t:
NIit = Accrualsit +OCFit (4.2)
Where
• NIit is net income
• Accrualsit is accruals
• OCFit is operating cash flow
We use a definition by Hope et al. (2013) in order to derive accruals, and use the
relationship in equation 4.2 to derive OCF. The definition of accruals is:
Accrualsit = (CAit −Cashit)− (CAi,t−1 −Cashi,t−1)−∆NIBCLit −Depit (4.3)
Where
• CAit is current assets.
• Cashit is cash and cash equivalent.
• NIBCLit is non-interest bearing current liabilities.
• Depit is depreciation.
This definition of accruals is used throughout the paper. As accruals are central to
several of our measures, we will do a robustness test using an alternative definition
of accruals by Barth et al. (2008).13
13Accruals = ∆Inventoriest + ∆Receivablest + +∆OtherCurrentAssetst − ∆Payables −
∆OtherCurrentLiabilities−Depreciation
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4.2.2 Accrual Based Measures
Discretionary Accruals (1)
Our first measure of accrual quality is based on the Jones (1991) model and mea-
sures the extent of discretionary accruals. In the model we regress variables that
drive non-discretionary accruals, such as growth in revenues and gross level of PPE,
on total accruals. The residual in the regression, the unexplained variation in total
accruals, represents the firms’ discretionary accruals. We use total accruals as our
dependent variable because this captures more management manipulation than fo-
cusing on just one specific accruals type. Non-discretionary accruals reflect business
conditions that naturally creates accruals, while discretionary accruals are related
to management choices. Discretionary accruals are thus a better measure for AQ
than total accruals, which is why we use the residual in the regression as our proxy
for AQ. We incorporate ROA in the regression to control for firm performance and
we also control for firm size (Kothari et al., 2005).
Accrit = β0 + β1(
1
Assetsi,t−1
) + β2∆Revit + β3PPEit + β4ROAit + it (4.4)
Where
• Accrit is total accruals scaled by lagged total assets.
• ∆Revit is change in revenues scaled by lagged total assets.
• PPEit is property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets.
• ROAit is return on assets.
As firms can use accruals to both increase and decrease their net income, we take
the absolute value of the residual and multiply it with negative one (Hope et al.,
2013). This is our proxy for Discretionary Accruals (DiscA).
DiscA = −|it| (4.5)
A higher value for DiscA represents better AQ. Our hypotheses for this measure are:
H11 = NUFs have lower value for DiscA than limited companies.
H21 = Opting out of audit leads to lower DiscA.
A high amount of discretionary accruals reflects lower AQ, but this interpretation
may not always be right. Firms can have a high proportion of discretionary accruals
for good reasons, such as high growth firms, which is a weakness with the measure.
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We correct for this by including a measure that focuses on estimation errors in
accruals, which directly measures how well firms are estimating their accruals. We
also look at the extent of discretionary revenues.
Discretionary Estimation Errors (2)
This model builds on Dechow and Dichev (2002)’s model and assesses total estima-
tion errors in working capital accruals (WCA).14 Accruals are based on assumptions
and estimates that need to be corrected in the future if they turn out to be wrong.
Short-term working capital accruals should be explained by last, this, and next years
operating cash flows, as accruals are transitory and should revert. The residuals in
the model are unrelated to cash flow realizations, and will thus include estimation
errors and corrections. We adjust for PPE and the change in revenue, as these are
long-term drivers of accruals. Lastly we incorporate a dummy variable for negative
operating cash flow to proxy for losses, as this controls for the timely loss aspect
of accruals, and strengthens the model (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006, Dechow and
Dichev, 2002, Francis et al., 2005).15 Our model does not include next years oper-
ating cash flows, as we have no data for 2014, and we consider it vital to base our
analyses on data for three years post reform.
WCAit = β0 + β1OCFi,t−1 + β2OCFit + β3∆Revit
+ β4PPEit + β5Neg OCFit + β8OCFit ∗Neg OCFit + it
(4.6)
Where
• WCAit is working capital accruals scaled by lagged total assets.
• OCFit is cash flow from operations scaled by lagged total assets.
• OCFi,t−1 is last year’s cash flow from operations scaled by lagged total assets.
• Neg OCFit is a dummy-variable equal to one if cash flows from operations is
negative.
The residuals in the regression are working capital accruals not explained by last
years and this years OCF, PPE and change in revenue. This deviation from the
expected value of working capital accruals, represented by the absolute value of the
14WCA is calculated as change is non-cash current assets less change in current liabilities not
including short-term debt and taxes payable (Hope et al., 2013)
15Accruals mitigate noise in OCF (OCF and WCA negatively correlated), and deal with timely
recognition (OCF and WCA positively correlated). By including a dummy for negative cash flow
we counterweight the negative correlation between WCA and OCF present in the model, as OCF
and WCA are positively correlated in times of losses.
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residual multiplied by negative one, is our proxy for accrual quality (DiscEE).
DiscEE = −|it| (4.7)
A higher value of DiscEE represents higher AQ. For this measure, we hypothesize:
H12 = NUFs have a lower value for DiscEE than limited companies.
H22 = Opting out of audit leads to lower DiscEE.
As we do not have enough data to include next year’s cash flow, our model may
somewhat overestimate the error in short-term accruals. A solution for this would
be to forecast next year’s cash flow, but we do not possess the relevant information
to accurately do that. Forecasting OCF would also introduce an element of mea-
surement error, and we consider it most appropriate to exclude next year’s cash flow.
Using several measures for accrual quality should somewhat mitigate this weakness,
as we can interpret these measures in conjunction to strengthen our findings.
Discretionary Revenues (3)
Our third model measures discretionary revenues. We regress the change in rev-
enues on the change in accounts receivable. Accounts receivable consist of a non-
discretionary and a discretionary part, where the non-discretionary part does not
require management estimations. The discretionary part is however subject to man-
agement discretion. By controlling for the change in revenue in the model, we have
controlled for the non-discretionary part of accounts receivables through the change
in revenues (Stubben, 2010).
∆ARit = β0 + β1∆Revit + it (4.8)
Where
• ∆ARit is the change in accounts receivable scaled by lagged total assets.
The absolute value of the residuals multiplied with negative one is the proxy for
discretionary revenues (DiscRev). In this model, a higher value of DiscRev indicates
higher AQ.
DiscRev = −|it| (4.9)
We hypothesize that:
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H13 = NUFs have a lower value for DiscRev than limited companies.
H23 = Opting out of audit leads to lower DiscRev.
A weakness with this model is that it will somewhat understate discretionary rev-
enues (Stubben, 2010).16
Size of Accruals (4)
Our fourth measure of AQ is the size of accruals (SizeAccr), calculated as the ab-
solute value of total accruals scaled by operating cash flow. Since earnings man-
agement is essentially a function of manipulating accruals it is intuitive to use the
size of accruals as an indicator of AQ. Using accruals to misstate earnings by us-
ing aggressive revenue recognition or overstating reported earnings can be done in
a number of ways, but in most cases the cash flow is unaffected. By scaling total
accruals with operating cash flow (OCF) we also account for the fact that larger
firms have higher accruals, and the size of accruals is more comparable across firms.
A higher ratio of accruals to operating cash flow is indicative of using accruals to
inflate earnings, indicating lower AQ (Burgstahler et al., 2006).
SizeAcc = −|ln (|Accrualsit
OCFit
|)| (4.10)
We multiply the absolute value of our ratio with negative one, so that a higher
number represents better AQ. We hypothesize that:
H14 = NUFs have a lower value for SizeAccr than limited companies.
H24 = Opting out of audit leads to lower SizeAccr.
It should be noted that high levels of accruals do not directly translate to lower AQ,
as it is normal that for example high growth firms have higher levels of accruals.
This is a weakness in the model. In our analysis we will assess the overall level of
accruals to operating cash flow, and the estimates will be a rough measure of AQ,
but our main focus will remain with the first three accrual based measures as they
assess discretionary components of accruals.
16See appendix C.1 for further explanation.
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4.2.3 Earnings Smoothing (5)
Variance in Net Income
The next proxy for AQ measures the volatility in the change in net income. If firms
target their earnings towards small positive (or negative) numbers, variability in the
change in net income will be smaller than in the absence of earnings management.
We have change in net income as our dependent variable, and control for factors
that affects it such as size, growth and leverage (Barth et al., 2008, Frøyshov and
Johansen, 2011, Lang et al., 2006). More earnings management should result in
lower variability in earnings, which is indicative of lower AQ.
∆NIit =β0 + β1Sizeit + β2Growthit + β3Levit+
+ β4Ageit + β5Revit + β6OCFit + β7AUDit + it
(4.11)
Where
• ∆NIit = Change in net income scaled by lagged total assets.
• Sizeit = The natural logarithm of total assets.
• Growthit = Relative growth in revenue.
• Levit = Interest bearing debt over book value of equity.
• Ageit = The firm’s age measured from the year of incorporation.17
• Revit = Revenue scaled by lagged total assets.
• AUDit = Dummy variable indicating if the firm is audited in the first analysis,
and if the firm is audited by a ”Big 5” auditor in analysis 2.
Our proxy for AQ, variance in change in net income (VCNI), is calculated as the
variance in the residuals for each firm. Higher VCNI indicates better AQ, and we
hypothesize that:
H15 = NUFs have a lower value for VCNI than limited companies.
H25 = Opting out of audit leads to lower VCNI.
A weakness with this measure is that firms exercising big bath accounting will
be considered to have good AQ. Big bath accounting is another form of earnings
management where firms take big losses one year with the intention of artificially
improve next year’s earnings. This kind of reporting will increase the variance in net
income, which we interpret as good AQ (Barth et al., 2008). However, the sample
of small firms we look at have a limited amount of resources and it is not likely
17The variable ”Age” is not available in analysis 1, as the data on NUF’s year of registration is
lacking for a majority of our observations.
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that they exercise this form of earnings manipulation. The model will only provide
one observation per firm in the first analysis, and two per firm in the second. This
is also a weakness with the measure, as we loose most of the time variation in the
data. However, the accruals quality and timely loss recognition measures utilize the
time variation in the observations. The earnings smoothing measure is also a good
complement for measuring AQ in firms with few accruals.
4.2.4 Timely Loss Recognition
The timely loss recognition measures are fitted to our model directly, and thus
treated differently than the first five measures.
Conditional Conservatism (6)
Timely loss recognition is a form of conditional conservatism, stating that bad news
are more readily implemented than good news (Basu, 1997). Accruals serve two
purposes. They mitigate noise in the operating cash flow with regards to earnings,
and deal with unrealized gains and losses. The first purpose implies a negative
correlation between accruals and operating cash flows. In this model, developed by
Ball and Shivakumar (2005), we are concerned with the second role of accruals, as
how firms deal with unrealized gains and losses reveal how well their accounting is
in line with conditional conservatism.
The assumption behind this model is that the probability of accrued losses is greater
in periods with negative cash flows. Timely loss recognition is based on information
about expected, not realized, cash flows and are thus handled through accruals. This
implies that timely loss recognition infers a positive correlation between current
year’s operating cash flows and accruals, because revisions (through accruals) in
current year’s cash flow are positively correlated with revisions in expected future
cash flows.
In the model we have accruals as our dependent variable, explained by operating
cash flow as our regressor. We include an interaction term with a dummy variable for
negative cash flow from operations multiplied with OCF, in line with the assumption
that accrued losses is greater in periods with negative cash flows.
Accrit = β0 + β1OCFit + β2Neg OCFit
+ β3Neg OCFit ∗OCFit + i,t
(4.12)
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For our first analysis we fit the measure to our model by adding a variable for NUF
and by including control variables, as seen in appendix C.2. We hypothesize that:
H16 = NUFs have less conditional conservatism than limited companies.
In our second analysis, we fit the measure to our model by adding a dummy for
firms that can opt out, and a dummy for firms who drop their auditor, as seen in
appendix C.2. We also include control variables. We hypothesize that:
H26 = Opting out of audit leads to lower conditional conservatism.
The validity of conditional conservatism measures has been criticized, as results have
differed depending on the choice of measure (Wang et al., 2008). Results from the
measure must be interpreted with this in mind. To account for this we use a second
proxy, measuring timely loss recognition with a different approach.
Large Negative Results (7)
Our last measure of AQ is the frequency and size of losses, where a lower frequency
of large negative results indicates lower AQ. If earnings are being managed, losses
could potentially be spread out over a period of time. We control for revenue and
operating cash flow because these will directly affect net income, as well as other
relevant control variables (Barth et al., 2008).
We fit the measure to our model by adding a dummy variable for NUF and auditor
in our first analysis. In our second analysis we add a dummy variable for firms
who can opt out, and for firms who drop their auditor. We include relevant control
variables in both analyses.
LNEGit =β0 + β1Sizeit + β2Growthit + β3Levit+
+ β4Ageit + β5Revit + β6OCFit + it
(4.13)
Where
• LNEGit is Large Negative Result. A dummy variable equal to one if Net
Income divided by Total Assets is less than -0.2.
We hypothesize that:
H17 = NUFs have less large negative results than limited companies.
H27 = Opting out of audit leads to less large negative losses.
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Big bath accounting will also reflect good AQ in this measure, and this is a weakness.
But in line with our previous argument, big bath accounting is not likely to be
exercised in small firms.
4.2.5 Control Variables
Controlling for firm characteristics and the relevant factors which affect firms’ in-
centives or ability to report precise estimates is important for our analysis. We use
several control variables that previous research have found to impact AQ (Borgersen
and Thorsbakken, 2014, Hope et al., 2013) or internal controls (Ashbaugh-Skaife
et al., 2009), and we include variables that control for firm characteristics. Through
the natural logarithm of total assets (Size) and growth in revenue (Growth) we con-
trol for the fact that small and young firms often have higher accruals than larger
and more mature firms. This is due to their need of growing their asset side in
order to meet future demand. To control for firms’ overall performance we control
for return on assets (ROA), and we control for firms’ reported cumulative loss ratio
(Cum Loss) as this is found to increase the likelihood of internal control deficien-
cies. Capital structure and financing needs are found to impact AQ and we control
for these through firms’ financial leverage (Lev). We also control for the fact that
managers have a high degree of flexibility in estimating the value of their inventory
(Inv). Based on previous research of ”Big 5” and external accountants impact on
AQ, we also control for this in our analysis.18 As our data set is anonymous, the
”Big 5” are the five audit companies with the most clients in our data set. The big
five audit companies in our paper are assumed to be Deloitte, KPMG, EY, PwC
and BDO. We include firms’ age as a control variable to control for the possibility
that a firms’ position in the life cycle has an impact on AQ (i.e. older firms have
established better control routines).
We scale all relevant variables with lagged total assets to address the issue of het-
eroskedasticity (Kothari et al., 2005).19 This also makes the variables comparable
across firms. As proposed in prior research (see Barth et al., 2008, Francis et al.,
2005, Kothari et al., 2005, Lang et al., 2006, Stubben, 2010), we winsordise all rele-
vant variables at the 1st and 99th percentile to control for potential outliers. This
is especially important as several of our dependent and independent variables are
ratios. These could yield extreme outliers, which could materially alter the results
of our regressions (Gujarati, 2008).
18In analysis 1 we control for firms being audited instead of firms being audited by Big 5
19We scale by lagged total assets, as opposed to total assets, because total assets may be deter-
mined jointly with other variables, or total assets may be a function of the scaled variables.
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4.3 Discontinuity Analysis of the Threshold for
Voluntary Audit
In our third analysis we look at possible bunching of firms below the revenue-limit
for voluntary audit, following the bunching methodology used by Saez (2010) and
Chetty et al. (2011). We explore the revenue threshold, because the majority of small
firms close to being eligible for voluntary audit are not close to having 20 million in
assets or 10 employees. The distribution of firms, if no bunching is present, should
be convex with the number of firms decreasing with revenue. Figure 4.1, based on
a figure by Harju et al. (2015), illustrates this with the number of firms (frequency)
on the Y-axis, and revenue on the X-axis. It shows the distribution of firms both as
it is assumed to be without bunching (the counterfactual distribution), and how it
looks if firms bunch below the threshold (actual distribution).
Following Saez (2010)’s suggested method we first inspect the distribution visually
to see if a spike appear at the threshold of 5 million by constructing a histogram with
a bin width of 20 000, meaning that the frequency shows how many firms that have
revenues between 4,400,000-4,420,000, 4,420,000-4,440,000 etc.20 We then overlay
these histograms with a quadratic best fit line with a 95 percent confidence interval
to assess if there is a significant difference between the amount of firms on either
side of the threshold.
In order to quantify the number of bunching firms, we use Chetty et al. (2011)’s
program in Stata.21 With this program we calculate the number of bunching firms
and the amount of excess mass by constructing a polynomial line for the distribution,
excluding the firms around the threshold. The program excludes the excess and
missing mass when calculating the counterfactual distribution, and fits the points
to a seventh-degree polynomial. This method may overestimate the amount of
firms bunching, because the area under the actual distribution is larger than the
area under the counterfactual distribution. To adjust for this, the program shifts
the counterfactual distribution to the right of the threshold upwards, until the two
areas are equal. This accounts for the missing mass to the right of the threshold,
but may somewhat underestimate the amount of firms bunching. This enables us to
conclude with more certainty, but the quantified bunching may be larger than our
results suggest.
20After trying several bin sizes we have trough visual inspection set the optimal bin size to
20,000. This bin size is used for the rest of our analysis.
21The program is called bunch count and is written by Tore Olsen.
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Figure 4.1: Bunching Behaviour Illustrated
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Results
In this section we present the results for the three parts of our study. We first
present our findings from the correlational analysis of differences in AQ between
small NUFs and limited companies. Second, we exhibit the results from our DiD
analyses of AQ after the introduction of voluntary audit. Third, we present the
findings of our discontinuity analysis of bunching behaviour around the threshold
for voluntary audit.
5.1 Correlational Analysis of AQ for NUFs
In our first analysis we look for significant differences in accounting quality between
small NUFs and limited companies. Our overarching hypothesis is that NUFs have
relatively lower AQ, and this is tested through the hypotheses for our seven proxies
for AQ, H11 through H17. Our expectations are summed up in table 5.1.
5.1.1 Descriptive Results
As shown in table A.5, the mean values for our three indicators for accrual quality
suggest that limited companies have relatively higher AQ. The mean of the measure
for size of accruals signals that limited companies have higher accruals relative to
operational cash flow than NUFs.
5.1.2 Accrual Based Measures
The results for our accrual based measures are presented in table B.1.22 The three
relevant coefficients in the measures for accrual quality are all negative and signifi-
22The number of firm-year observations for model one, three and four are the same. Model two
includes less firm year observations due to the models structure. Model two includes a lagged
variable β1OCFi,t−1, and lacks observations for t = 2006 and t = 2007.
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Table 5.1: Expectations NUF
Proxy Hypothesis Expectation
Accrual Based Measures
DiscA H11 β1 < 0
DiscEE H12 β1 < 0
DiscRev H13 β1 < 0
SizeAccr H14 β1 < 0
Earnings Smoothing
Var Change NI H15 β1 < 0
Timely Loss Recognition
Accruals H16 β7 < 0
LNEG H17 β1 < 0
1 β1 = NUF and β7 = Neg OCF ∗OCF ∗NUF
cant at the one percent level. This is in line with our hypotheses and indicate that
NUFs have lower AQ than limited companies. For the fourth model the coefficient
is positive and significant at the five percent level, contrary to H4A. This indicates
that NUFs have less accruals relative to operating cash flow than limited compa-
nies. Our focus regarding accruals quality does however remain with the first three
measures, as they focus on discretionary accruals. We find no statistical significant
relationship between having an auditor and the four measures of AQ.
As NUFs have lower accrual quality, but relatively fewer accruals, this substanti-
ates our claim that NUFs have lower AQ than limited companies. They have less
accruals, but more errors or manipulations. As the coefficients for Auditor in all
four models are not significant, they apparently differ in something else than their
use of auditor. Our findings suggest that NUFs have more discretionary accruals,
more discretionary estimation errors and more discretionary revenues than limited
companies. This indicate that NUFs to a higher extent manipulate or incorrectly
state their accruals, which provides external stakeholders with incorrect information
and could provide a wrongful basis for taxation.
5.1.3 Earnings Smoothing
We find no statistically significant difference in our earnings smoothing measure
between NUFs and limited companies, as shown in table B.2. This means that we
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have no grounds to conclude whether small NUFs exhibit more earnings smoothing
than small limited companies. This is not in line with Frøyshov and Johansen
(2011) findings. They find that NUFs have statistically lower variance in change in
net income than limited companies. Their findings are however not robust. We find
no statistical significant relationship between having an auditor and our measure of
earnings smoothing.
5.1.4 Timely Loss Recognition
The results from model six and seven are shown in table B.3. In model six, the
coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant. This is not in line
with our hypothesis. It indicates that NUFs take their losses in a more timely
manner than small limited companies, providing their external stakeholders with
more accurate information about their operations. In the seventh model, we find no
statistically significant differences in the occurrence of large negative losses between
NUFs and small limited companies. This contrasts with Frøyshov and Johansen
(2011)’s findings, where they find NUFs to have a lower frequency of large negative
results than limited companies.
5.1.5 Robustness Tests
We test the robustness of our findings by scaling all relevant variables with average
total assets instead of lagged total assets.23 In addition to this, we use an alterna-
tive definition of accruals and operating cash flow, supplied by Barth et al. (2008).24
When scaling with average total assets, nothing materially changes in our findings
and all signed coefficients stay the same.25 When using different definitions of ac-
cruals and operating cash flow none of our conclusions change. In light of this we
believe our findings to be robust.
5.2 DiD Analysis of AQ in Limited Companies
In analysis two, we want to assess whether dropping an auditor leads to lower
accounting quality. We first present descriptive results. We then test the parallel
23Average total assets is calculated as (TotalAssets+ LaggedTotalAssets)/2
24Accruals = ∆Inventoriest + ∆Receivablest + +∆OtherCurrentAssetst − ∆Payables −
∆OtherCurrentLiabilities−Depreciation
25We use average total assets as opposed to total assets because total assets may be determined
jointly with other variables, or total assets may be a function of the scaled variables themselves.
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trend assumption, before we present the results of our analysis.
Our overarching hypothesis is that dropping your auditor leads to lower accounting
quality. This is tested through the hypotheses for our seven proxies for AQ, H21
through H27. Our expectations are summed up in table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Expectations Limited Companies
Proxy Hypothesis Expectation Expectation
Opt Out vs Opt Out vs
Do Not Can Not
Accrual Based Measures
DiscA H21 β2 < 0 β1 + β2 < 0
DiscEE H22 β2 < 0 β1 + β2 < 0
DiscRev H23 β2 < 0 β1 + β2 < 0
SizeAccr H24 β2 < 0 β1 + β2 < 0
Earnings Smoothing
Variance Change NI H25 β2 < 0 β1 + β2 < 0
Timely Loss Recognition
Accruals H26 β11 < 0 β10 + β11 < 0
LNEG H27 β2 < 0 β1 + β2 < 0
1 β1 = CanOptOut and β2 = DropAuditor.
2 β10 = Neg OCF ∗OCF ∗CanOptOut and β11 = Neg OCF ∗OCF ∗DropAud
When interpreting the regression output for all models except model six, β1 + β2
is the treatment effect for those who drop their auditor. In model six, β10 + β11 is
the treatment effect for those firms who drop their auditor. Our first control group
consists of firms that keep their auditor, and our second control group consists of
firms not eligible for voluntary audit.
5.2.1 Descriptive Results
In table A.8, A.9 and A.10 we present descriptive results for firms opting out of audit,
firms keeping their auditor and firms not eligible for voluntary audit respectively.
Firms not eligible for voluntary audit have higher means for the two first accrual
quality measures, but lower for the third. Higher values translate to higher AQ. This
applies to both before and after the reform. All three groups have higher means for
accruals relative to operational cash flow after the reform.
Opt out firms have lower accruals quality and less accruals relative to operating cash
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flow than firms that keep their auditor, both before and after the reform. Firms
which keep their auditor have higher means for all three accruals quality measures
after the reform, while opt out firms have higher means for measure one (DiscA)
and three (DiscRev).
5.2.2 Testing the Parallel Trend Assumption
In order to establish a causal relationship between opting out of audit and our
measures for AQ, we first reaffirm there are no systematic differences between our
treatment and control groups in absence of treatment (see Angrist and Pischke,
2008, page 237). To do this we impose the assumption that the law change happens
in 2009, and control for the treatment effects in subsequent years. This way our
placebo treatment in 2009 will only capture pre-reform variation. If trends are
parallel, the pre-reform variation should not be significantly different from zero.
The results from our placebo tests are shown in table C.1 and C.2. When comparing
the treatment group (firms dropping their auditor) and the first control group (firms
who keep their auditor), the parallel trend assumption does not hold for the second
and third measure as we find significant differences between the groups. This means
we can not interpret these estimates causally. The parallel trend assumption does
however hold for all measures when comparing the treatment and second control
group (firms not eligible for voluntary audit). This allows us to make a causal
interpretation of our results. Due to its construction, we only have two data points
per firm in measure five. We can not adjust for the treatment effects in 2011, and a
placebo test for this measure would not give meaningful results.
5.2.3 Accrual Based Measures
The results of our first four models are shown in table C.3. For our first three
measures, β2 is negative and significant, indicating there is a decline in accrual
quality for the treatment group when compared to those who keep their auditor,
after treatment. These findings are significant at the one, five and one percent level
respectively. We also observe that β1 + β2 < 0 for all three models, indicating
a decline in accrual quality for the treatment group when compared to those not
eligible for voluntary audit, after treatment. A Wald test shows that the sums of
the coefficients are significant. These findings are in line with our hypotheses.
The relevant coefficients in our fourth measure are not significant, and we can not
conclude whether there are significant differences in accruals relative to operating
Larsen & Løchen 39
Chapter 5
cash flow between our treatment and control groups.
The results from our first three models indicate that dropping your auditor leads
to lower AQ. As we reject the parallel trend assumption for our second and third
measure when comparing firms who drop and firms who keep their auditor, this
causal relationship may be biased. However, we do not reject the parallel trend
assumption between those who drop and those not eligible for voluntary audit, and
the fact that all three accrual quality measures are negative and significant increase
our confidence in that dropping your auditor leads to lower AQ. This implies that
firms who drop their auditor may have a wrongful tax base, and that their financial
statements are of lower value to other external stakeholders.
5.2.4 Earnings Smoothing
The results for our fifth model are shown in table C.4. In order to calculate the
variance in net income, we collapse the data on each firm before and after 2011.
This leaves us with one observation per firm pre and post reform.26
Our findings indicate that there is a decline in the variance in net income for the
treatment group when compared to firms who keep their auditor after treatment
(β2 < 0). This is significant at the five percent level. We also see that there is a
decline in variance in net income for our treatment group compared to firms not
eligible for voluntary audit, after treatment, shown by β1 + β2 < 0. A Wald test
shows that the sum of the coefficients is significant.
Opting out of audit leads to lower variance in net income, which is indicative of
earnings smoothing and lower AQ. This will impact the firms’ tax basis, and make
their financial statements of lower value to other external stakeholders.
5.2.5 Timely Loss Recognition
Results from the regression analyses for model six and seven are shown in table
C.5. In model six the relevant coefficients are not significant, and we can not con-
clude whether there is a relationship between opting out of audit and conditional
conservatism.
For our seventh model, β2 is negative and significant. This indicates that the treat-
ment group exhibits a decline in the frequency of large negative results when com-
pared to those who keep their auditor, following treatment. As β1 + β2 < 0 our
26Using Stata’s ”collapse” function.
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results indicate that there is a decline in the frequency of large negative results
for our treatment group when compared to firms not eligible for voluntary audit,
following the treatment. The findings are significant at the one percent level.
Our findings imply that opting out of audit leads to less timely loss recognition and
lower AQ. This indicates that firms dropping their auditor may spread out their
losses over a period of time, making their financial statements of lower value to
external stakeholders.
5.2.6 Robustness Tests
Our results are robust when using alternative definitions for accruals and operating
cash flow. In our analyses, the dummy variable indicating whether a firm can drop
its auditor or not, is time varying after the reform. This means that a firm with
revenues higher than 5 millions in 2011, may be eligible for voluntary audit in 2012 if
their revenues drop below 5 million. Our analyses yields the same results when this
dummy variable is not time varying, and based on total revenues in 2010. Identifying
firms eligible for voluntary audits in 2010 also accounts for the possibility that the
firms in question actively position themselves under the limits once the law change
is declared in 2011. When scaling all our relevant variables with average total assets,
the findings in proxy one through three are no longer significant. Our findings do
not change for the earnings smoothing or timely loss recognition measures. We thus
believe our overall findings to be robust, but the accrual based measures must be
interpreted with caution.
5.2.7 Adjusting for ”Big 5”
It is interesting to investigate if dropping a ”Big 5” auditor has an effect on ac-
counting quality beyond the effect of dropping any auditor. As shown in table C.6,
C.7 and C.8, only proxy one shows that dropping a ”Big 5” auditor leads to a
larger decline in AQ when compared to dropping an auditor in general. There is no
significant impact of dropping a ”Big 5” auditor in model 2-7.
These findings are interesting, because they suggest that the type of auditor dropped
is not significant for the magnitude of the effect on AQ in our measures. This is not
in line with previous research. Small firms are easier to audit, which may limit the
added value of using a ”Big 5” auditor, and thus limit the extra effect of dropping
one.
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5.3 Discontinuity Analysis of the Threshold for
Voluntary Audit
The visual inspection of the histograms exhibiting the yearly distribution of firms,
as seen in figure D.1, shows no spike just below the threshold for the years 2008-
2010. This is in line with our expectations of firms not adapting prior to the reform.
Starting in 2011 we see clear indications of bunching behaviour intensifying year-
by-year in the form of a spike in the distribution below the threshold. The year-
by-year distribution is graphed in figure D.2 and confirms the tendencies seen in
the histograms. Aggregated data pre and post reform are shown in figure D.3 and
D.4. They complement the year-by-year distributions, and visually verify that the
threshold leads to bunching behaviour.
In order to determine if there is a significant difference in the amount of firms above
and below the threshold, we plot the distribution of firms in a histogram for the
interval of revenue between four and six million. We include a quadratic best fit
line with a 95 percent confidence interval, as shown in figure 5.1.27 This figure
shows a distinct discontinuity in the quadratic best fit line, indicating that there is
a significant difference in the distribution of firms above and below the threshold.
Figure D.6 shows the same illustration for the years before the law change and we
observe that there is no discontinuity in the 95 percent confidence interval.
Inspection of bunching behaviour exhibited by small limited companies post reform
enables us to look at the short-term effects of introducing the threshold. In order
to explore the longer-term effects, we look at the distribution of NUFs between
2006-2013, as displayed in figure D.7. The graph shows how NUFs with four to six
millions in revenues are distributed. The low amount of NUFs makes it harder to
visually detect bunching behaviour, but the illustration shows that the highest spike
is just below the threshold of five million.28 The amount of firms in the bunching
region is too small to say anything conclusive about long-term effects of bunching.
The small number of firms does however indicate that the results in our analysis
of bunching behaviour exhibited by limited companies post reform is not driven by
NUFs who change their corporate form.
We use Chetty et al. (2011)’s program to quantify the number of bunching firms,
and the results are presented in figure 5.2. This shows the distribution of total firms
as a function of total revenues around the NOK 5 million revenue limit for voluntary
27Scatter plot of the bins are included in D.5
28This is the highest spike in the interval of NUFs with 4-6 millions in revenues. When including
all firms between zero and ten millions we did not observe any bunching behaviour other places.
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Figure 5.1: Bunching Histogram with Quadratic Best Fit Post Reform
audit, using data from after the law change was enacted (2011 - 2013). The solid
line is the actual distribution, while the dotted line is the counterfactual distribution
fitted to a seventh degree polynomial.29 Point zero on the X-axis represents the
threshold of NOK 5 million. The interval from 4,84M to 5,1M is excluded when
calculating the counterfactual distribution, represented by the two vertical dotted
lines. We first assume that firms start exhibiting bunching behaviour NOK 160,000
below the threshold, and this interval is selected through a visual inspection of the
histogram in figure 5.1. We assume that bunching behaviour starts at the point
where we observe that the frequency of firms, represented by the quadratic best fit
line, starts increasing.30 This interval seems economically reasonable, as managing
streams of revenues perfectly can be difficult. Excess mass is the amount of firms
exceeding the projected amount of firms below the threshold. It is calculated as the
area above the counterfactual distribution and represents the number of bunching
firms. The analysis yields an excess mass of 189 firms, representing a surplus of 52
percent relative to the counterfactual distribution.
If we assume that bunching behaviour starts at NOK 60,000 below the threshold, we
29Changing the degree of the polynomial does not materially change our findings.
30The end-point of the interval is chosen through visual inspection of the figure itself, and
represents the point at which the actual distribution is close to the counterfactual distribution.
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Figure 5.2: Bunching 2011 - 2013
exclude the interval between NOK 4.94M and 5.06M when calculating the counter-
factual distribution, as shown in figure D.8. This strict assumption says that firms
are able to manage their earnings almost perfectly, and we choose this point as the
frequency of firms from 4.94M to 5M is strictly increasing, indicating a certain break
with the downward sloping distribution. We observe a total of 60 firms bunching
below the threshold, representing an excess mass of 16.46 percent when compared
to the counterfactual distribution. To assess whether this behaviour is instigated by
the 2011 law change, we run the strict calculations on the data from year 2006 to
2010, with the results shown in figure D.9. We find no evidence of bunching in the
pre reform period, as results show an excess mass of negative 9.14 percent.
These analyses show that firms actively bunch under the threshold for voluntary
audit. There are no indications of bunching in the period before 2011, both when
evaluating yearly and aggregate data. This implies that introducing the threshold
for voluntary audit causes firms to actively bunch below the threshold. We do not
attempt to discover how firms bunch below the threshold, but they either have
to reduce output, or misstate their revenues. The first represents an unfortunate
unintended side effect, incentivizing some firms to stop growing. The latter would
make their financial accounts of lower value to both the tax authorities and other
external stakeholders.
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Summary and Concluding
Remarks
In this paper we search for differences in accounting quality between small NUFs
and limited companies, the effect dropping your auditor has on accounting quality,
and how firms adapt when faced with a revenue threshold for voluntary audit.
In our first analysis we find that small NUFs have lower accruals quality, but more
timely loss recognition than small limited companies. We can not conclude whether
NUFs have lower AQ in general. In our second analysis we find a negative causal
relationship between dropping an auditor and accounting quality. Dropping your
auditor leads lower accruals quality, more earnings smoothing and less timely loss
recognition. In our third analysis we find that introducing a threshold for voluntary
audit leads some firms to bunch below this threshold in order to avoid being audited.
Analysis of pre-reform data shows no bunching tendencies, and analysis of yearly
data post-reform shows that the effect is intensifying.
Our study highlights the costs related to the introduction of voluntary audit, and
not the benefits. It is meant to serve as a contribution to the evaluation of the 2011
reform, but the trade-off between costs and benefits remains a political question.
The measurements used to assess AQ are developed for large, or at least larger,
firms than we examine in our paper. This could impair their effectiveness when
used on small companies. As the law change has been active for four years, and we
have data on three of these, we can only say something about the short-term effects
of the reform. In future research it would be interesting to see if the same effects is
observed in the long-term.
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Appendix A
Variable Definitions
Table A.1: Variable Definitions
Variables Definitions
Dependent variables:
DiscA Discretionary Accruals; Defined in section: 4.2.2 (1)
DiscEE Discretionary Estimation Errors; Defined in section: 4.2.2 (2)
DiscRev Discretionary Revenues; Defined in section: 4.2.2 (3)
SizeAccr Size of Accruals; Defined in section: 4.2.2 (4)
Var ∆ NI Variance in change in Net Income: Defined in section 4.2.2 (5)
Accr Accruals Defined in section 4.2.2 (6)
LNEG Large Negative Results. Defined in section 4.2.2 (7)
Control variables
NUF Dummy variable equal to one if the company is a NUF and equal
to zero if it is a small limited company
Can Opt Out Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is eligible for voluntary
audit
Drop Aud Dummy variable equal to one if the firm opts out of audit
Auditor Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has an auditor
Size The natural logarithm of total assets
ROA Return on Assets; Net Income/Average Total Assets
Lev Financial Leverage; Total Interest Bearing Debt/Equity
Growth Growth in Revenue;
Inv Scaled Inventories scaled by total assets
Cum Loss Cumulative loss. Measured by the cumulative percentage
of sample years with negative NI
Big5 Dummy variable equal to one if auditor is one of
the big 5 (Deloitte, PwC, KPMG, EY or BDO)
Accountant Dummy variable equal to one if firm has an external accountant
Age The firm’s age measured from year of incorporation
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A.1 Sample Selection
Table A.2: Sample Selection for NUF vs AS Analysis
AS NUF Total
Total number of firm-year observations 1,801,332 121,489 1,922,821
- less firms with revenues higher than 5 million 1,173,877 64,506 1,238,383
- less firms with negative or missing revenues 1,071,459 46,278 1,117,737
- less firms with total assets higher than 20 million 957,763 45,984 1,003,747
- less firms with negative or missing total assets 957,180 45,625 1,002,805
- less firms with more than 10 employees 948,712 45,336 994,048
- less firms with missing or negative employees 948,712 45,336 994,048
- less firms which are closing down 945,123 44,013 989,136
- less firms with missing NACE-codes 892,400 41,549 933,949
- less firms within the finance industry 770,579 38,674 809,253
- less firms within the power industry 764,759 38,610 803,369
- less firm observations from 2011-2013 421,835 20,184 442,019
Number of unique firm observations 107,597 8,886 116,483
Table A.3: Sample Selection: Voluntary Audit for AS
#of firms #of firm-years
Observations of AS 331,404 1,801,332
- less firms with revenues higher than 10 million 251,830 1,373,983
- less firms with negative or missing revenue 251,791 1,257,999
- less firms with total assets higher than 20 million 229,322 1,119,022
- less firms with negative or missing total assets 229,243 1,118,414
- less firms with more than 10 employees 223,455 1,086,245
- less firms with missing or negative employees 223,455 1,086,245
- less firms which are closing down 223,221 1,082,408
- less firms with missing NACE-codes 201,164 1,026,896
- less firms within the finance industry 186,828 903,203
- less firms within the power industry 185,654 896,853
- less firms without observations for all years 56,554 452,432
Total number of observations 56,554 452,432
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A.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table A.4: NUFs With and Without Auditor
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Auditor 12 (0.7%) 16 (0.6%) 22 (0.6%) 32 (0.7%) 28 (0.4%)
No Auditor 1,631 (99.3%) 2,664 (99.4%) 3,958 (99.4%) 5,279 (99.4%) 6,542 (99.6%)
Total 1,643 2,680 3,980 5,311 6,570
Descriptive statistics NUF sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Threshold values:
Total Employees 20,184 0.656 1.235 0 10
Total Revenues 20,184 605,008 816,785 0 4.997e+06
Total Assets 20,184 416,715 871,485 0 1.883e+07
Dependent variables:
DiscA 10,312 -0.548 0.742 -5.067 -8.05e-05
DiscEE 5,549 -0.390 0.636 -5.475 -5.22e-05
DiscRev 10,312 -0.208 0.258 -1.547 -4.84e-06
SizeAccr 10,393 -1.036 1.120 -11.83 0
Control variables:
Size 18,293 11.90 1.912 0 16.75
ROA 10,674 -0.0921 0.743 -2.986 1.095
Lev 18,181 0.0183 8.367 -39.33 58.54
Growth 9,276 0.803 2.650 -1 14.89
Inv Scaled 18,293 0.0613 0.178 0 0.926
Cum Loss 20,184 0.213 0.265 0 1
Table A.5: Descriptive Statistics NUF Sample
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Descriptive statistics AS sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Threshold values:
Total Employees 421,835 0.891 1.541 0 10
Total Revenues 421,835 916,615 1.101e+06 0 5.000e+06
Total Assets 421,835 2.333e+06 3.223e+06 0 2.000e+07
Dependent variables:
DiscA 309,676 -0.284 0.504 -5.168 -1.01e-06
DiscEE 214,336 -0.216 0.459 -5.551 -1.09e-07
DiscRev 309,676 -0.0787 0.157 -1.547 -7.94e-07
SizeAccr 304,067 -1.077 1.174 -14.30 0
Control variables:
Size 420,255 13.73 1.662 0 16.81
ROA 311,871 -0.0396 0.481 -2.986 1.095
Lev 421,480 1.443 9.818 -39.33 58.54
Growth 236,494 0.381 1.961 -1 14.89
Inv Scaled 420,255 0.0673 0.185 0 0.926
Cum Loss 421,835 0.185 0.212 0 1
Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics AS Sample
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What distinguishes a NUF from an AS?
(1)
VARIABLES Marginal probability
Total Employees -0.00000273*
(0.00000144)
Owner is CEO -0.00001689*
(0.00000889)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing -0.00000903*
(0.00000494)
Construction Industry 0.00001951*
(0.00001128)
Wholesale and retail trade 0.00001846*
(0.00001098)
Transport, storage and communication 0.00002147
(0.00001487)
IT Industry 0.00005062*
(0.00002817)
Real Estate Industry -0.00002065*
(0.00001099)
Academic, scientific and technical services 0.00002865*
(0.00001575)
Business activities 0.00002150
(0.00001328)
Education 0.00004436
(0.00003363)
Health and social work 0.00001483
(0.00001152)
Size -0.00001522**
(0.00000768)
ROA 0.00001186*
(0.00000613)
Growth 0.00000172*
(0.00000088)
Inventory -0.00001470*
(0.00000847)
Auditor -0.22947823***
(0.00612716)
Accountant 0.00004375**
(0.00002158)
Observations 245,207
Pseudo R-sq 0.707
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.7: What Distinguishes a NUF from an AS?
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Descriptive statistics: Firms which qualify for voluntary audit and opt out
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Before 2011:
Threshold values:
Total Employees 117,568 1.196 1.708 0 10
Total Revenues 117,568 1.239e+06 1.403e+06 0 9.984e+06
Total Assets 117,568 1.909e+06 2.463e+06 0 1.999e+07
Dependent variables:
DiscA 113,197 -0.251 0.448 -4.960 -1.27e-06
DiscEE 83,937 -0.197 0.424 -5.643 -2.64e-06
DiscRev 113,197 -0.0853 0.155 -1.561 -3.99e-07
SizeAccr 111,491 -1.050 1.106 -12.81 0
Control variables::
Size 117,282 13.70 1.505 0 16.81
ROA 113,356 -0.00477 0.432 -2.986 1.095
Lev 117,536 1.122 9.139 -39.33 58.54
Growth 95,983 0.295 1.724 -1 14.89
Inventory 117,282 0.0830 0.197 0 0.926
Cum Loss 117,568 0.164 0.160 0 0.625
After 2011:
Threshold values:
Total Employees 117,568 1.171 1.631 0 10
Total Revenues 117,568 1.172e+06 1.326e+06 0 9.981e+06
Total Assets 117,568 1.956e+06 2.545e+06 0 1.997e+07
Dependent variables:
DiscA 117,169 -0.238 0.447 -4.960 -8.62e-07
DiscEE 117,169 -0.203 0.456 -5.717 -2.88e-07
DiscRev 117,170 -0.0789 0.152 -1.561 -1.08e-06
SizeAccr 114,642 -1.078 1.144 -13.02 0
Control variables:
Size 117,046 13.65 1.669 0 16.81
ROA 117,264 -0.00873 0.446 -2.986 1.095
Lev 117,486 0.771 7.792 -39.33 58.54
Growth 98,695 0.188 1.519 -1 14.89
Inventory 117,046 0.0826 0.200 0 0.926
Cum Loss 117,568 0.320 0.247 0 1
Table A.8: Firms which Qualify for Voluntary Audit and Opt Out
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Chapter A
Descriptive statistics: Firms which qualify for voluntary audit, but keep their auditor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Before 2011:
Threshold values:
Total Employees 119,152 1.013 1.784 0 10
Total Revenues 119,152 1.395e+06 1.728e+06 0 9.998e+06
Total Assets 119,152 3.577e+06 3.889e+06 0 2.000e+07
Dependent variables:
DiscA 114,707 -0.239 0.452 -4.960 -8.98e-07
DiscEE 85,071 -0.172 0.377 -5.643 -1.85e-06
DiscRev 114,707 -0.0682 0.143 -1.561 -1.31e-06
SizeAccr 112,074 -1.057 1.158 -14.10 0
Control variables:
Size 118,938 14.37 1.507 0 16.81
ROA 114,873 0.00901 0.382 -2.986 1.095
Lev 119,124 1.807 10.33 -39.33 58.54
Growth 89,032 0.327 1.761 -1 14.89
Inventory 118,938 0.0613 0.176 0 0.926
Cum Loss 119,152 0.157 0.166 0 0.625
After 2011:
Threshold values:
Total Employees 119,152 1.040 1.779 0 10
Total Revenues 119,152 1.453e+06 1.737e+06 0 9.998e+06
Total Assets 119,152 3.867e+06 4.066e+06 0 2.000e+07
Dependent variables:
DiscA 118,887 -0.212 0.409 -4.696 -8.98e-07
DiscEE 118,887 -0.170 0.393 -5.800 -2.19e-07
DiscRev 118,887 -0.0598 0.130 -1.561 -7.44e-07
SizeAccr 115,661 -1.094 1.196 -14.10 0
Control variables:
Size 118,825 14.44 1.579 0 16.81
ROA 118,951 -0.00457 0.401 -2.986 1.095
Lev 119,097 1.326 8.892 -39.33 58.54
Growth 92,497 0.223 1.549 -1 14.89
Inventory 118,825 0.0622 0.179 0 0.926
Cum Loss 119,152 0.306 0.266 0 1
Table A.9: Firms which Qualify for Voluntary Audit, but Keep their Auditor
58 Larsen & Løchen
Chapter A
Descriptive statistics: Firms which cannot opt out
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Before 2011:
Threshold values:
Total Employees 25,376 3.792 2.527 0 10
Total Revenues 25,376 4.638e+06 2.543e+06 0 9.992e+06
Total Assets 25,376 2.804e+06 2.404e+06 0 1.991e+07
Dependent variables:
DiscA 24,779 -0.201 0.305 -4.078 -5.55e-06
DiscEE 18,443 -0.114 0.195 -4.466 -1.06e-07
DiscRev 24,779 -0.0946 0.137 -1.421 -1.77e-07
SizeAccr 24,714 -1.051 1.031 -11.49 0
Control variables:
Size 25,362 14.50 0.935 2.944 16.81
ROA 24,785 0.114 0.216 -2.986 1.095
Lev 25,370 0.938 5.548 -39.33 58.54
Growth 23,704 0.221 1.139 -1 14.89
Inventory 25,362 0.135 0.224 0 0.926
Cum Loss 25,376 0.0824 0.122 0 0.625
After 2011:
Threshold values:
Total Employees 25,376 4.174 2.550 0 10
Total Revenues 25,376 5.392e+06 2.633e+06 0 1.000e+07
Total Assets 25,376 3.343e+06 2.747e+06 0 1.996e+07
Dependent variables:
DiscA 25,364 -0.163 0.217 -4.194 -7.49e-06
DiscEE 25,364 -0.100 0.163 -4.745 -7.86e-07
DiscRev 25,364 -0.0819 0.118 -1.509 -9.72e-09
SizeAccr 25,313 -1.076 1.041 -12.33 0
Control variables:
Size 25,364 14.70 0.924 0 16.81
ROA 25,368 0.104 0.196 -2.986 1.095
Lev 25,374 0.795 5.044 -39.33 58.54
Growth 24,505 0.0898 0.648 -1 14.89
Inventory 25,364 0.138 0.228 0 0.926
Cum Loss 25,376 0.156 0.191 0 1
Table A.10: Descriptive Statistics: Firms which Cannot Opt Out
Larsen & Løchen 59
Chapter A
What Characterizes a Firm that Drop its Auditor?
(1)
VARIABLES Marginal probability
Total Revenues -0.00039022***
(0.00001735)
Total Assets -0.00025651***
(0.00001366)
Total Employees 0.01110263***
(0.00152902)
Age -0.00095276***
(0.00018362)
Owner CEO 0.08235653***
(0.00415686)
Historic Negative Audit Report 0.05043489***
(0.00450806)
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0.05490684***
(0.01755618)
Mining and Quarrying -0.11860731***
(0.03396042)
Real Estate Industry -0.07599316***
(0.00545626)
Business Activities -0.06499564***
(0.01034995)
Health and Social Work 0.09008532***
(0.01249551)
Private households with Employees 0.04448525**
(0.01739436)
Other Services 0.08319385***
(0.01626528)
ROA 0.01419972***
(0.00405578)
Inventory 0.10808153***
(0.01137617)
Cumulative Loss Ratio -0.09429875***
(0.01237312)
Accountant 0.17132230***
(0.00400343)
Observations 228,034
Pseudo R-sq 0.0878
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 Total Revenues, Total Assets and Inventory are multiplied
by 10,000. A NOK 10,000 increase in inventory will increase
the probability of a firm dropping an auditor by 10.8 percent.
Table A.11: What Characterizes a Firm that Drop its Auditor?
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Chapter A
What characterizes bunching firms?
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Buncher Placebo1 Placebo2
Just below t-1 0.0578*** 0.0576*** 0.0559***
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0060)
Just below t-2 0.0257*** 0.0250*** 0.0261***
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0044)
Just below (t-1)*(t-2) -0.0366* 0.0517* 0.0726*
(0.0222) (0.0305) (0.0379)
Just above t-1 0.0442*** 0.0360*** 0.0386***
(0.0055) (0.0047) (0.0053)
Just above t-2 0.0187*** 0.0175*** 0.0188***
(0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0039)
Just above (t-1)*(t-2) 0.0140 -0.0002 -0.0232
(0.0300) (0.0231) (0.0221)
Construction Industry 0.0007** 0.0004 0.0005**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Wholesale and retail trade 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 0.0012***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Hotels and restaurants 0.0026*** 0.0020*** 0.0019***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
IT Industry -0.0011*** -0.0007* -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Real Estate Industry -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0004**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Education -0.0015** 0.0014 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Health and social work 0.0015** 0.0033*** 0.0026***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Other Services 0.0021** 0.0030*** 0.0030***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Accountant 0.0019*** 0.0016*** 0.0009***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Constant 0.0020*** 0.0021*** 0.0017***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Observations 534,922 534,922 534,922
R-squared 0.0070 0.0078 0.0080
Year FE YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.12: What Characterizes Bunching Firms?
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Appendix B
Analysis 1
62
Chapter B
Accounting Quality for AS versus NUF, Accrual Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DiscA DiscEE DiscRev SizeAccr
NUF -0.1384*** -0.0650*** -0.0660*** 0.0326**
(0.0078) (0.0091) (0.0033) (0.0162)
Size 0.0607*** 0.0728*** 0.0350*** 0.0190***
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0019)
ROA 0.0310*** 0.0887*** -0.0405*** 0.0295***
(0.0061) (0.0092) (0.0016) (0.0081)
Leverage 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0050***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Growth -0.0408*** -0.0377*** -0.0149*** -0.0029***
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0011)
Inventory 0.1056*** 0.0845*** 0.0585*** 0.0975***
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0015) (0.0115)
Cummulative Loss -0.0868*** -0.1249*** -0.0153*** -0.0029
(0.0059) (0.0069) (0.0022) (0.0135)
Accountant 0.0129*** 0.0095*** -0.0041*** 0.0122**
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0048)
Auditor 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0051
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0015) (0.0100)
Constant -1.0909*** -1.1764*** -0.5806*** -1.2945***
(0.0158) (0.0207) (0.0050) (0.0291)
Observations 244,171 171,495 244,171 244,171
R-squared 0.1156 0.1674 0.1423 0.0036
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 Sample size in model two differs from the rest due to the model’s struc-
ture. 2 VIF tests show no problems with respect to collinearity.
3 Years included: t = 2006 to t = 2010 4 Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level.
Table B.1: NUF vs AS, Model 1 - 4
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Chapter B
Accounting Quality for AS versus NUF, Earnings Smoothing
(1)
VARIABLES Variance Change Net Income
NUF -0.0247
(0.0949)
Size -0.5287***
(0.0152)
ROA -2.3655***
(0.1319)
Leverage 0.0036***
(0.0009)
Growth 0.1653***
(0.0136)
Inventory -1.0825***
(0.0459)
Cummulative Loss -0.6156***
(0.1195)
Auditor 0.0013
(0.0494)
Accountant -0.0810***
(0.0205)
Constant 8.0203***
(0.2319)
Observations 67,663
R-squared 0.1780
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 Data is collapsed on orgnr using Stata’s Collapse command.
2 VIF test shows no problems with respect to collinearity.
3 Years included in the collapse are t = 2006 to t = 2010.
4 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Table B.2: NUF vs AS, Model 5
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Chapter B
Accounting Quality for AS versus NUF, Timely Loss Recognition
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Total Accruals Large Negative Results
Scaled OCF -0.6749*** 0.0271***
(0.0084) (0.0015)
Negative OCF 0.1250***
(0.0030)
Neg OCF * OCF -0.0365***
(0.0126)
NUF -0.0407*** 0.0034
(0.0107) (0.0043)
Neg OCF * NUF 0.1108***
(0.0188)
OCF * NUF -0.0275
(0.0230)
Neg OCF * OCF * NUF 0.2071***
(0.0496)
Auditor -0.0037 -0.0027
(0.0023) (0.0023)
Rev Scaled 0.0004
(0.0004)
Constant 0.2679*** 0.6951***
(0.0135) (0.0088)
Observations 244,171 244,171
R-squared 0.6871 0.4933
Year FE YES YES
Control Variables YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 The relevant coefficients are NegOCF ∗ OCF ∗ NUF and NUF re-
spectively. 2 VIF test shows no problems with respect to collinearity.
3 Years included: t = 2006 to t = 2010.
4 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Table B.3: NUF vs AS, Model 6 - 7
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Analysis 2
66
Chapter C
Placebo Test, Accrual Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DiscA DiscEE DiscRev SizeAccr
can opt out p09 0.0000 0.0116*** -0.0021 -0.0314**
(0.0039) (0.0032) (0.0018) (0.0154)
drop aud p09 -0.0025 -0.0088*** 0.0033** 0.0176
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0013) (0.0112)
Size 0.0013 0.0305*** 0.0002 0.0454***
(0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0008) (0.0043)
ROA -0.0722*** -0.0534*** -0.0530*** -0.0892***
(0.0062) (0.0083) (0.0017) (0.0092)
Leverage -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0021***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Growth -0.0313*** -0.0270*** -0.0106*** -0.0084***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0012)
Inventory 0.0537*** 0.0372*** 0.0852*** 0.0156
(0.0154) (0.0143) (0.0043) (0.0258)
Cummulative Loss -0.1195*** -0.1364*** -0.0279*** -0.0606***
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0030) (0.0227)
Big 5 -0.0045** -0.0058*** -0.0011 -0.0072
(0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0074)
Accountant 0.0104*** 0.0071*** 0.0010 0.0058
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0077)
Age 0.0002 -0.0047*** -0.0007*** -0.0001
(0.0018) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0038)
Constant -0.2307*** -0.5115*** -0.0916*** -1.6340***
(0.0466) (0.0451) (0.0113) (0.0728)
Observations 369,042 317,671 369,042 369,042
R-squared 0.0397 0.0345 0.0450 0.0017
Number of orgnr 58,825 58,393 58,825 58,825
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 Sample size in model two differs from the rest due to the model’s struc-
ture. 2 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
3 Years included: t = 2007 to t = 2013.
4 Wald test shows that the sum of the coefficients CanOptOutp09 and
DropAudp09 are not significant for any of the models.
5 Treatment dummies for subsequent years are included, but not shown.
Table C.1: AS Model 1 - 4, Placebo
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Accounting Quality for AS, Timely Loss Recognition
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Accruals Large Negative Results
Scaled OCF -0.7112*** 0.0391***
(0.0099) (0.0016)
neg alt ocf 0.1061***
(0.0037)
neg ocf x ocf -0.0346**
(0.0176)
can opt out p09 -0.0015 0.0010
(0.0051) (0.0026)
drop aud p09 -0.0235*** -0.0009
(0.0075) (0.0023)
all three can opt out p09 -0.0207
(0.0460)
all three drop aud p09 -0.0164
(0.0635)
Rev Scaled -0.0054***
(0.0005)
Constant 0.5857*** 0.8058***
(0.0423) (0.0210)
Observations 369,042 369,042
R-squared 0.7158 0.3680
Number of orgnr 58,825 58,825
Year FE YES YES
Firm FE YES YES
Control Variables YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 The relevant coefficients are DnegOCF ∗OCF ∗CanOptOutp09
and DnegOCF ∗ OCF ∗ DropAuditorp09 for the accrual model,
and DropAud09 and CanOptOutp09 for the ”Large Negative Re-
sults” model. 2 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
3 Years included: t = 2007 to t = 2013. 4 Wald test shows the
sum of the coefficients of the interaction terms are not significant
in in either model. 5 Treatment dummies for subsequent years
are included, but not shown.
6 Extra interaction terms are included, but not shown.
Table C.2: AS Model 6 - 7, Placebo
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Chapter C
Accounting Quality for AS, Accrual Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DiscA DiscEE DiscRev SizeAccr
Can Opt Out -0.0033 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0151
(0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0094)
Drop Auditor -0.0079*** -0.0045** -0.0033*** 0.0011
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0075)
Size 0.0013 0.0305*** 0.0002 0.0451***
(0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0008) (0.0043)
ROA -0.0723*** -0.0534*** -0.0530*** -0.0892***
(0.0062) (0.0083) (0.0017) (0.0092)
Leverage -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000* 0.0021***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Growth -0.0313*** -0.0270*** -0.0106*** -0.0084***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0012)
Inventory 0.0538*** 0.0375*** 0.0853*** 0.0157
(0.0154) (0.0143) (0.0043) (0.0258)
Cummulative Loss -0.1202*** -0.1363*** -0.0279*** -0.0586***
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0029) (0.0227)
Big 5 -0.0045** -0.0057*** -0.0011 -0.0073
(0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0074)
Accountant 0.0104*** 0.0071*** 0.0010 0.0059
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0077)
Age 0.0001 -0.0047*** -0.0007*** -0.0000
(0.0018) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0037)
Constant -0.2307*** -0.5112*** -0.0913*** -1.6308***
(0.0466) (0.0451) (0.0113) (0.0724)
Observations 369,042 317,585 369,042 369,042
R-squared 0.0397 0.0345 0.0449 0.0017
Number of orgnr 58,825 58,387 58,825 58,825
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 Sample size in model two differs from the rest due to the model’s struc-
ture. 2 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 3 Years included:
t = 2007 to t = 2013. 4 Wald test shows the sum of the coefficients Can
Opt Out and Drop Aud is significant at: 1% level for model 1, 10% level
for model 2 and 5% level for model 3. It is not significant in model 4.
Table C.3: AS, Model 1 - 4
Larsen & Løchen 69
Chapter C
Accounting Quality for AS, Earnings Smoothing
(1)
VARIABLES Variance Change Net Income
Can Opt Out -0.0650***
(0.0143)
Drop Auditor -0.0491**
(0.0200)
Size -0.8893***
(0.0466)
ROA -0.4687***
(0.1381)
Leverage 0.0017**
(0.0008)
Growth 0.1678***
(0.0141)
Inventory -0.8773***
(0.2263)
Cummulative Loss -0.1446*
(0.0863)
Big 5 0.0054
(0.0196)
Accountant 0.0003
(0.0258)
Age -0.2813**
(0.1174)
Constant 16.7298***
(1.7092)
Observations 109,011
Number of orgnr 56,849
R-squared 0.1023
Year FE YES
Firm FE YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 Data is collapsed on orgnr and on period (before
and after 2011) using Stata’s Collapse command.
2 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
3 Years included in the collapse are t = 2007 to
t = 2010 before, and t = 2011 to t = 2013 after.
5 Wald test shows the sum of the coefficients Can Opt
Out and Drop Aud is significant at: 1% level.
Table C.4: AS, Model 5
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Accounting Quality for AS, Timely Loss Recognition
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Accruals Large Negative Results
Scaled OCF -0.7043*** 0.0391***
(0.0083) (0.0016)
DnegOCF 0.1111***
(0.0030)
DnegOCF*OCF -0.0318**
(0.0143)
Can Opt Out -0.0025 -0.0105***
(0.0041) (0.0016)
Drop Auditor -0.0308*** -0.0082***
(0.0053) (0.0016)
DnegOCF*Can Opt Out -0.0081
(0.0056)
DnegOCF*Drop Auditor 0.0464***
(0.0078)
OCF*Can Opt Out -0.0051
(0.0198)
OCF*Drop Auditor 0.1131***
(0.0249)
DnegOCF*OCF*Can Opt Out 0.0064
(0.0295)
DnegOCF*OCF*Drop Auditor -0.0381
(0.0406)
Rev Scaled -0.0054***
(0.0005)
Constant 0.5779*** 0.8056***
(0.0422) (0.0210)
Observations 369,042 369,042
R-squared 0.7152 0.3679
Number of orgnr 58,825 58,825
Year FE YES YES
Firm FE YES YES
Control Variables YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 The relevant coefficients are DnegOCF ∗ OCF ∗ CanOptOut and
DnegOCF ∗ OCF ∗ DropAuditor for the accrual model, and
DropAuditor and CanOptOut for the ”Large Negative Results” model.
2 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
3 Years included: t = 2007 to t = 2013. 4 Wald test shows the sum of
the coefficients Can Opt Out and Drop Aud is significant at: 1% level
for model 7. It is not significant for model 6.
Table C.5: AS, Model 6 - 7
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Accounting Quality for AS, Accrual Quality (Big5)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DiscA DiscEE DiscRev SizeAccr
Can Opt Out -0.0029 0.0001 0.0007 0.0151
(0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0094)
Drop Auditor -0.0048** -0.0023 -0.0028*** 0.0031
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0074)
Drop Big5 Auditor -0.0099*** -0.0034 -0.0012 0.0016
(0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0016) (0.0118)
Size 0.0013 0.0305*** 0.0002 0.0451***
(0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0008) (0.0043)
ROA -0.0723*** -0.0533*** -0.0530*** -0.0892***
(0.0062) (0.0083) (0.0017) (0.0092)
Leverage -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000* 0.0021***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Growth -0.0313*** -0.0270*** -0.0106*** -0.0084***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0012)
Inventory 0.0539*** 0.0372*** 0.0853*** 0.0158
(0.0154) (0.0143) (0.0043) (0.0258)
Cummulative Loss -0.1203*** -0.1361*** -0.0279*** -0.0587***
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0029) (0.0227)
Accountant 0.0104*** 0.0071*** 0.0010 0.0058
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0077)
Age 0.0001 -0.0048*** -0.0007*** -0.0000
(0.0018) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0037)
Constant -0.2308*** -0.5125*** -0.0913*** -1.6317***
(0.0466) (0.0451) (0.0113) (0.0724)
Observations 369,042 317,671 369,042 369,042
R-squared 0.0397 0.0344 0.0449 0.0017
Number of orgnr 58,825 58,393 58,825 58,825
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 Sample size in model two differs from the rest due to the model’s struc-
ture. 2 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
3 Years included: t = 2007 to t = 2013.
Table C.6: AS Model 1 - 4, Big5
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Chapter C
Accounting Quality for AS, Earnings Smoothing (Big5)
(1)
VARIABLES Variance Change Net Income
Can Opt Out -0.0652***
(0.0143)
Drop Auditor -0.0526**
(0.0206)
Drop Big5 Auditor 0.0095
(0.0348)
Size -0.8894***
(0.0466)
ROA -0.4687***
(0.1381)
Leverage 0.0017**
(0.0008)
Growth 0.1678***
(0.0141)
Inventory -0.8775***
(0.2263)
Cummulative Loss -0.1443*
(0.0863)
Accountant 0.0004
(0.0258)
Age -0.2811**
(0.1174)
Constant 16.7286***
(1.7093)
Observations 109,011
Number of orgnr 56,849
R-squared 0.1023
Year FE YES
Firm FE YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 Data is collapsed on orgnr and on period (before and af-
ter 2011) using Stata’s Collapse command.
2 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
3 Years included in the collapse are t = 2007 to t = 2010
before, and t = 2011 to t = 2013 after.
Table C.7: AS Model 5, Big5
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Accounting Quality for AS, Timely Loss Recognition (Big5)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Accruals Large Negative Results
Scaled OCF -0.7041*** 0.0391***
(0.0083) (0.0016)
DnegOCF 0.1111***
(0.0030)
DnegOCF*OCF -0.0319**
(0.0143)
Can Opt Out -0.0030 -0.0105***
(0.0042) (0.0016)
Drop Auditor -0.0325*** -0.0088***
(0.0055) (0.0016)
Drop Big5 Auditor 0.0106 0.0025
(0.0083) (0.0026)
DnegOCF*OCF*Can Opt Out 0.0056
(0.0296)
DnegOCF*OCF*Drop Auditor -0.0432
(0.0418)
DnegOCF*OCF*Drop Big5 Auditor 0.0371
(0.0704)
Rev Scaled -0.0054***
(0.0005)
Constant 0.5781*** 0.8056***
(0.0422) (0.0210)
Observations 369,042 369,042
R-squared 0.7153 0.3679
Number of orgnr 58,825 58,825
Year FE YES YES
Firm FE YES YES
Control Variables YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 The relevant coefficients are DnegOCF ∗OCF ∗ CanOptOut, DnegOCF ∗
OCF ∗DropAuditor and DnegOCF ∗OCF ∗DropBig5for the accrual model.
2 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 3 Years included: t = 2007
to t = 2013. 4 The regression also includes interaction terms not interpreted
or shown.
Table C.8: AS Model 6 - 7, Big5
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C.1 Discretionary Revenues
Our fourth measure for AQ is based on Stubben (2010). We use the change in
accounts receivable as our dependent variable, and the change in revenue as our
independent variable. The residual from this regression is a proxy for accounting
quality, but the amount of discretion will be somewhat understated.
Revenues consist of a discretionary part γ, and a non-discretionary part.
Rev = Revnon−disc + γ (C.1)
If we assume, as done in Stubben (2010) that a part of the non-discretionary revenues
(c) is uncollected each year, and we do not collect cash from discretionary revenues,
then Account Receivables is:
AR = c ∗Revnon−disc + γ (C.2)
γ is the same for both revenues and receivables, which means that any increase in
γ will influence both accounts receivable and revenue the same way.
By combining the two, to account for the fact that the non-discretionary revenues
are non-observable, and taking the first difference, we are left with the expression:
∆AR = c ∗R + (1− c)∆γ (C.3)
The model we use is:
∆ARi,t = β0 + β1∆Revi,t + i,t (C.4)
As Rev includes discretionary revenues we will be understating discretionary rev-
enues  by a factor of (1− c) (see Stubben, 2010).
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C.2 Conditional Conservatism
In our first analysis, we extend the model by adding a dummy variable for NUF.
Accrit = β0 + β1OCFit + β2Neg OCFit + β3Neg OCFit ∗OCFit
+ β4NUFit + β5Neg OCFit ∗NUFit + β6OCFit ∗NUFit
+ β7Neg OCFit ∗OCFit ∗NUFit + it
(C.5)
The test for conditional conservatism is β7, where a negative coefficient implies that
the firm represented by the Dummy has less conditional conservatism, implying
lower AQ.
In our second analysis, we extend the model by adding one dummy for firms that
can opt out, and one for firms that actually drop their auditor.
Accrit = β0 + β1OCFit + β2Neg OCFit + β3Neg OCFit ∗OCFit
+ β4Can opt outit + β5Drop audit + β6Neg OCFit ∗ Can opt outit
+ β7Neg OCFit ∗Drop audit + β8OCFit ∗ Can opt outit
+ β9OCFit ∗Drop audit + β10Neg OCFit ∗OCFit ∗ Can opt outit
+ β11Neg OCFit ∗OCFit ∗Drop audit + it
(C.6)
The test for conditional conservatism is β10 and β11.
C.2.1 Explanation
The first role of accruals, to reduce noise in cash flow, is is presented by:
Accrit = β0 + β1OCFit + ... (C.7)
The the coefficient β1 should be negative, so that accruals and OCF are negatively
correlated.
The second role of accruals is presented by
Accrit = ...+ β3 ∗Neg OCFit ∗OCFit (C.8)
As Neg OCF will be one when OCF is negative, the two terms together will always
be negative or 0. The coefficient β3 should be positive. To see why this is the
case, remember that conditional conservatism means you take your losses when
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you are supposed to. If this is the case, conditional conservatism should act as
a counterweight to the negative correlation between Accr and OCF . In times of
losses (OCF < 0), the following will happen: β1 ∗ OCF > 0 which reduces noise,
and β3 ∗Neg OCF ∗OCF < 0 to counterweight this.
When we include NUF in the equation, as shown above, the test for conditional
conservatism is β7Neg OCFit ∗OCFit ∗NUFit. If β7 < 0, it means that NUFs have
less conditional conservatism than limited companies.
In our second analysis, the test for conditional conservatism is β10Neg OCFit ∗
OCFit ∗Can opt outit and β11Neg OCFit ∗OCFit ∗Drop audit. If β11 < 0 it means
that firms who drop their auditor have less conditional conservatism than firms who
keep their auditor. If β10 + β11 < 0 it means that firms who drop their auditor have
less conditional conservatism than firms not eligible for voluntary audit.
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Appendix D
Analysis 3
Figure D.1: Bunching Histogram Year-by-Year
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Figure D.3: Distribution of Limited Companies, pre reform
Figure D.4: Distribution of Limited Companies, post reform
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Figure D.5: Bunching Limited Companies, Scatter Plot
Figure D.6: Bunching Histogram with Quadratic Best Fit Pre Reform
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Figure D.7: Distribution of NUFs, 2006-2013
Figure D.8: Bunching Limited Companies, 2011 - 2013 Strict
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Figure D.9: Bunching Limited Companies, 2006 - 2010
Larsen & Løchen 83
